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Political scientists examining the phenomenon of policy diffusion have routinely found that 
states within a similar geographical region tend to adopt similar policies over time. This result 
has been proven over a wide range of social policies and time periods.  The theoretical logic 
behind the “contiguous state” explanation is twofold.  First, states are in constant economic 
competition with each other for valuable resources such as industries and productive citizens, 
which in turn places pressure on state legislatures to emulate the public policies enacted by their 
adjacent neighbor so as not to lose the inter-state battle. Second, state governments and agencies 
lack the necessary resources (in terms of money, time, and information) to conduct a thorough 
investigation of potential policies to address their specific public issues. Thus they engage in a 
form of “satisficing” where instead of enacting the ideal policy solution, state policy-makers 
simply adopt familiar and convenient policies from their neighboring states.  Unfortunately 
political scientists have only primarily applied this theory to the institution of state legislatures, 
raising the question about its generalizability to other public policy institutions.  This dissertation 
tests this question by applying the theory to the institution of public research universities while 
concurrently exploring a novel alternative explanation for policy diffusion – peer pressure.   
Using an original data set of three highly salient higher education policies (establishing a 
technology transfer office, launching a capital campaign, and raising tuition) this dissertation 
finds that the actions of one’s peers (universities that share similar levels of prestige) can have a 
greater influence than the actions of one’s geographical neighbors in determining the eventual 
implementation of specific policies. This finding highlights the importance of professional 
reputation when creating policy networks that lead to institutional innovations. 
 
 
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... IX 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... X 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................XI 
1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1 
1.1 POLICY CHANGES IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION........................... 1 
1.2 THE “CONTIGUOUS STATE” EXPLANATION TO POLICY CHANGE 2 
1.3 IS THE “CONTIGUOUS STATE” EXPLANATION GENERALIZABLE? 3 
1.4 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS............................................................ 4 
1.5 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE.......................... 5 
1.6 METHODS OF INQUIRY AND FINDINGS ................................................... 6 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION ......................................................... 8 
2.0 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................... 9 
2.1 THE DEFINITION OF DIFFUSION ................................................................ 9 
2.2 SEMINAL DIFFUSION STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.................. 11 
2.3 RECENT RESEARCH IN POLICY DIFFUSION ........................................ 13 
2.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 15 
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ........................... 16 
3.1 THEORETICAL REASONING FOR PEER DIFFUSION .......................... 18 
3.1.1 False Assumption #1: Regional Competition ........................................... 18 
3.1.2 False Assumption #2: Incomplete Information........................................ 20 
3.1.3 Normative Isomorphism and Professionalization.................................... 23 
3.2 THEORETICAL REASONING FOR INSTITUTIONAL  RULES, 
NORMS, AND ARRANGEMENTS ................................................................................. 26 
3.2.1 Normative Institutionalism ........................................................................ 27 
 v 
3.2.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism............................................................... 28 
3.3 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 30 
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION .............................. 31 
4.1 THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION.................. 32 
4.1.1 Decline in State Appropriations ................................................................ 33 
4.1.2 Entering the Marketplace .......................................................................... 35 
4.1.3 DV #1: Establishing a Technology Transfer Office ................................. 37 
4.1.4 DV #2: Engaging in a Private Fundraising Campaign............................ 40 
4.1.5 DV #3: Tuition............................................................................................. 43 
4.2 UNIT OF ANALYSIS........................................................................................ 46 
4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: DIFFUSION................................................ 47 
4.3.1 Peer Diffusion .............................................................................................. 47 
4.3.2 Regional Diffusion Variable....................................................................... 49 
4.4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: INSTITUTIONAL ..................................... 50 
4.4.1 Governance Structure ................................................................................ 50 
4.4.2 Medical School ............................................................................................ 52 
4.4.3 Land Grant .................................................................................................. 53 
4.4.4 Wealth .......................................................................................................... 53 
4.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: STATE ........................................................ 54 
4.6 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 55 
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS FROM MODEL #1 - ADOPTION OF 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICE................................................................................... 57 
5.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICE.. 58 
5.1.1 Diffusion Variables ..................................................................................... 60 
5.1.2 University Variables ................................................................................... 61 
5.1.3 State Variables ............................................................................................ 62 
5.1.4 Control Variables........................................................................................ 62 
6.0 CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS FROM MODEL #2  - CAPITAL CAMPAIGN...... 64 
6.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION........................................................................ 64 
6.1.1 Diffusion Variables ..................................................................................... 66 
6.1.2 University Variables ................................................................................... 67 
 vi 
6.1.3 State Variables ............................................................................................ 68 
6.2 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 69 
7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS FROM MODEL #3 - RAISING TUITION ...... 70 
7.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION........................................................................ 70 
7.1.1 Diffusion Variables ..................................................................................... 72 
7.1.2 University Variables ................................................................................... 74 
7.2 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 75 
8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT: CASE STUDIES IN ESTABLISHING TECH TRANSFER 
OFFICES ..................................................................................................................................... 76 
8.1 CASE STUDIES................................................................................................. 78 
8.1.1 Case Study #1: University of Washington ................................................ 78 
8.1.1.1 Local Economy and Leadership. ....................................................... 79 
8.1.1.2 Peer Diffusion...................................................................................... 80 
8.1.1.3 Medical School .................................................................................... 81 
8.1.1.4 Bayh—Dole Act................................................................................... 82 
8.1.2 Case Study #2: University of Pittsburgh................................................... 83 
8.1.2.1 Medical School .................................................................................... 85 
8.1.2.2 Peer Diffusion  .................................................................................... 86 
8.1.2.3 Local Leadership ................................................................................ 86 
8.1.3 Case Study #3: The University of Alabama at Birmingham................... 87 
8.1.3.1 Medical School and Faculty Leadership property. ......................... 89 
8.1.4 Case Study #4: The University of Louisville............................................. 90 
8.1.4.1 State Economic Development. ........................................................... 91 
8.1.4.2 Hospital. ............................................................................................... 92 
8.2 PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM AND POLICY ENTREPRENEURS...... 92 
8.3 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 95 
9.0 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION.......................................................................... 96 
9.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS............................................................................. 96 
9.2 IS PEER DIFFUSION GENERALIZABLE?................................................. 97 
9.3 CURRENT DIFFUSION RESEARCH ........................................................... 99 
APPENDIX A............................................................................................................................ 100 
 vii 
APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................ 103 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 108 
 viii 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 4.1: Hazard rate for adoption of technology transfer office ............................................... 39 
Table 4.2: Hazard rate for initiating a comprehensice capital campaign...................................... 42 
Table 4.3 Hazard rate for rising tuition rates ................................................................................ 45 
Table 4.4: Summary of Hypothesis .............................................................................................. 56 
Table 5.1: EHA Predicting TTO Adoptions ................................................................................. 59 
Table 6.1: EHA Predicting Capital Campaign Adoption.............................................................. 65 
Table 7.1: EHA Predicting Raising Tuition Adoption.................................................................. 71 
Table 7.2: Geographical Influence on Tuition Increases .............................................................. 73 
Table 8.1: Expectation vs. Actual Timing of TTO Adoption ....................................................... 77 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 4.1: State’s Budget to Higher Education (Source: NCES 2002) ....................................... 34 
Figure 4.2: Total Voluntary Support (Source: Chronicle of Higher Education) .......................... 40 
Figure 8.1: # of TTO Established by University of Washington’s Peer Group............................ 79 
Figure 8.2: # of TTOs Established by University of Pittsburgh’s Peer Group ............................. 84 
Figure 8.3: # of TTOs Established by UAB’s Peer Group ........................................................... 88 
Figure 8.4: # of TTOs Established by University of Louisville’s Peer Group ............................. 90 
Figure 9.1 Effect of trustee length on establishing a TTO............................................................ 99 
 x 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I want to take this opportunity to thank the people who have laughed, cried, and cheered 
me on throughout this adventure.  Thank you to my dissertation committee: Guy Peters–for 
introducing me to the world of public policy and exuding calmness when I needed it the most; 
Carman–for giving me the best advice as we  walked the streets of New Orleans; Susan Hansen-
it was in your class that I realized I had made the right decision to come back to school; and 
Michael McLendon–for making me realize that  a political scientist could  study within the field 
of higher education and in doing so hopefully enrich both disciplines; George Krause–for being 
my unofficial committee member and forcing me to think about the research each and every day.  
Thank you to my colleagues in Institutional Advancement: Al and Allie–for your constant 
understanding as I tried to juggle both my professional and academic worlds; Dave – for drafting 
talent over position; Steve–for the many lunches when we discussed the more important subjects 
in life, fantasy baseball and movies.   Thank you to my cohort: Kate–we may have started off on 
the wrong foot many years ago, but every step since then has led us to a long lasting friendship; 
Luis–your optimism and ability to overcome hurdles will always inspire me; Andrew, Kristen, 
and Zeke–whether in the classroom, in a living room, or on the soccer field, you have made these 
last five years so much more enjoyable. Thank you to my family: my parents–you have taught 
me that life is not about due dates or external expectations, but about personal experiences; my 
siblings–your accomplishments in life are what have set the standards for me to push myself that 
much harder; My in-laws–you have provided both an emotional and physical environment for 
me to flourish and have supported me in all my endeavors since the day we met; Lastly, and 
most importantly, thank you to my wife, Marcie and my son, Nate–you put everything in 
perspective; Sweetie – you have supported me when I’ve needed to be supported, you’ve 
challenged me when I’ve needed to be challenged, but most importantly you have loved me 
unconditionally.  I love you. 
 xi 
1.0  CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 POLICY CHANGES IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 
Over the last twenty-five years, dramatic changes have occurred in American public higher 
education in regards to raising revenue.  In that time public universities have gone from relying 
on state appropriations for the majority of their budget to relying on a more diverse stream of 
revenue sources (Kane and Orszag, 2003).  Instead of simply depending on the state government 
as the primary source for funding, public universities have increasingly implemented one or 
more of three alternative policies to augment their income – raising tuition, seeking greater 
contributions from private sources, and producing more commercially viable research.  These 
new policies have been criticized by public higher education advocates who say that the policies 
veer the institutions away from their traditional missions (Dennison, 2003).  Instead of public 
universities representing the goals of equal access, egalitarianism, and the pursuit of general 
knowledge, the advocates claim that the universities are now transforming themselves into 
private enterprises where accumulating wealth is the primary objective. Yet many university 
administrators argue that they have been forced to adopt these new policies in an effort to 
replenish the income they have lost because of the steady decline in state appropriations (Bok, 
2003).   University presidents and senior university leaders have been quick to point out that over 
the last two decades state appropriations for higher education have dropped significantly as a 
share of state expenditures (Kane and Orszag, 2003).  In other words, the enactment of the 
controversial policies is not evidence of a deliberate agenda to abandon responsibilities as a 
public institution, but simply a strategic response to a new fiscal environment. 
Regardless of whether the substantial policy changes are due to the decline in state 
allocations or part of a larger institutional strategy, this scenario does create an interesting 
opportunity to broaden the research of policy diffusion because the innovations are occurring in a 
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state agency that has been traditionally ignored by political scientists.  By using public 
universities as the unit of analysis, theories and variables customarily associated with diffusion 
research can be tested regarding their generalizability (Lowry 2001).   Specifically this 
dissertation will use universities to test the “contiguous state” theory and a broader array of 
institutional level variables.    
1.2 THE “CONTIGUOUS STATE” EXPLANATION TO POLICY CHANGE 
 It has been almost 50 years since Everett Rogers (1962) wrote his monumental book on the 
political phenomenon of policy diffusion.  It is in this seminal piece of social science literature 
that the concept of diffusion is first comprehensively defined as a process by which policies (or 
“innovations”) are communicated over time by individuals within a social system (1962, 5-6).  
Ideas are created, information is learned, uncertainty is addressed, and ultimately policies are 
adopted through this act of communication. Since Rogers’ book, the research area of policy 
diffusion has made significant and noteworthy advances.  Most notably in political science, Jack 
Walker (1969) and Virginia Gray (1972) applied Roger’s theoretical construct to the American 
states and uncovered the importance of geography as a significant explanatory variable.   More 
specifically, they found that contiguous states tended to adopt similar policies over time.  Over 
the last three decades, this discovery has been investigated in greater detail by other political 
scientists and has been statistically confirmed to be essential in understanding the means by 
which states innovate.  Some of the more prominent studies include the adoption of state lotteries 
(Berry and Berry 1990), abortion laws (Mooney and Lee 1995), welfare (Peterson and Rom 
1990), and economic development (Gray 1994). 
The theoretical logic behind the contiguous state explanation is twofold - one based on 
economics (Tiebout, 1956), the other based on social learning (Rogers 1962; Mintrom and 
Vergari 1998; Mooney 2001)   The underlying economics theory is that neighboring states are 
continually in competition with each other over a wide gamut of “resources” such as industries, 
citizens, and federal appropriations.   This competition motivates state legislatures to emulate the 
policies enacted by their adjacent neighbors for fear that if they don’t, they will be on the losing 
 2 
end of the inter-state battle (Tiebout, 1956; Berry and Berry 1990).1  Walker (1969) notes this 
reality when he comments that “(the) process of competition…is an important phenomenon 
which determines in large part the pace and direction of social and political change in the 
American states” (p.890).   The underlying social learning theory that helps explain the 
contiguous state phenomenon is that state governments lack the necessary resources (in terms of 
time, money, and information) to conduct a thorough investigation of potential policies to 
address their particular public issues.  Thus they engage in a form of “satisficing” (Simon 1959) 
where instead of enacting the ideal policy solution, state legislators adopt only familiar and 
convenient policies, which typically come from neighboring states.  
1.3 IS THE “CONTIGUOUS STATE” EXPLANATION GENERALIZABLE? 
As the diffusion literature broadens into other policy domains, the overall research remains 
relatively shallow.  This deficiency can be attributed to the fact that while different policies 
continue to be tested within the literature, state legislatures remain almost exclusively the only 
unit of analysis under question.2 Other policy-making institutions have rarely been analyzed by 
political scientists in relation to policy diffusion.  This narrow inquiry has stunted efforts to test 
the generalizability of the contiguous state theory.   
While the vast majority of scholars have taken Walker and Gray’s cue and studied the 
importance of regionalism as one of the main catalysts for the spread of innovations, the 
contiguous state explanation holds true only if both aforementioned theoretical underpinnings 
(regional competition and lack of information) accurately apply to the policy-making institution 
in question.  What if similar institutions in a mutual area are in fact not in competition with each 
other for the same resources and revenue – would regionalism continue to play a significant role 
in explaining diffusion?  What if the institutions in question are making policy decisions with 
more complete information? Again, would the contiguous state theory still apply?  These 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, states maybe a magnet for “undesirable” resources such as welfare recipients (Peterson and Rom 
1990). 
2 One exception is the work of Volden and Shipan (2006), who examine the diffusion of innovations by local 
governments. 
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questions have never been approached in the diffusion literature because of the traditional focus 
on policies enacted by state governments.  This is turn has impeded efforts to identify other 
methods by which innovations possibly spread beyond regionalism. 
Yet substantial literature, particularly in the field of organizational theory, has raised 
sound theoretical arguments for policy change beyond the motive of geography. DiMaggio and 
Powell’s conceptualization of normative isomorphic change and the importance of 
professionalization (1983) have proven that “organizational fields that include a large 
professionally trained labor force will be driven primarily by status competition” (153).  In other 
words, some organizations homogenize due to peer pressure – a desire to remain competitive 
with those who share identical levels of prestige.  Herein lays the underlying question of this 
dissertation: Can peer pressure be the primary incentive behind the policy adoptions of some 
public policy-making institutions?  
1.4 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The secondary hole in the diffusion literature caused by the overwhelming attention to state 
legislatures is the lack of analysis on the internal dynamics (e.g., the rules, norms, and 
preferences) of the policy-making institution.  Past studies have given only cursory recognition 
to the varying arrangements and design of the institutions implementing the policies.  This 
deficiency can be attributed to the fact that variation within state governments is typically limited 
to legislative partisanship and professionalism (Berry and Berry 1990).  This narrow exploration 
has led to a less than fully formed answer to why some states are more innovative than others.   
However, substantial literature in other subfields of political science proves the 
importance of institutional design as the prime mechanism for generating particular policy 
outputs (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Shepsle and Weingast 1994; Sinclair 1994).   Scholars have 
argued that the range of potential policies available to policy makers within an institution is 
endogenous, based heavily on the rules and values of that specific institution. Thus, innovations 
typically comply with the “logic of appropriateness” embedded within the organization (March 
and Olsen 1972).  This paper also highlights the need to consider the significance of the 
institutional arrangements when analyzing the adoption of specific policies. 
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1.5 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE  
The objective of this dissertation is to address the previously stated issues within the policy 
diffusion literature by constructing an original research project utilizing a unique unit of analysis 
for political science, American public research universities, and posing the question: which 
factors have caused three controversial revenue generating policies to spread and become 
adopted by public universities throughout the country? Are the determinants at the state level 
as some administrators have alleged or are the innovations due to institutional level variables 
(dependent on the decisions of university leaders) as critics have reputed?  This question will be 
applied to the three salient higher education policies – raising tuition, increasing private fund-
raising, and establishing a technology transfer office - collectively known as “privatization 
policies”.   
There are three reasons why universities provide additional analytical leverage beyond 
what is provided by state legislatures.  First, there is some question as to whom public 
universities compete against for their valued resources.  In some cases schools compete on a 
national scale, such as for faculty and federal grants.  In other cases they compete at the state 
level, such as for students and state appropriations.  This dynamic raises questions about the 
applicability of the contagious state theory and opens an opportunity to test alternatives.  Second, 
universities have greater access to information about their competition thanks to highly 
publicized rankings and data.  This valuable information generates a cognitive hierarchy for both 
university administrators and their external constituents (i.e., students, parents, desired faculty, 
and foundations).  Consequently, it allows universities to expand their search for policy solutions 
beyond the confines that typically limit their state government counterparts. Lastly, there is wide 
variation in the institutional arrangements that oversee and govern American public research 
universities, which in turn allows greater opportunity to compare and contrast how these 
variations may affect policy output (Lowry 2001). 
With that being said, the results of this dissertation question will make two significant 
contributions to the policy diffusion literature. First it will introduce a new construct of diffusion, 
“peer diffusion”, where some institutions will innovate because of a desire to maintain their 
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place among institutions of similar caliber.3  Peer diffusion is an appropriate model for 
institutions like public research universities, where regional competition is not as acute and 
information about their competition is more accessible as compared to state government.  Thus 
universities are more apt to learn from their national peers who hold a similar level of prestige as 
opposed to their geographical neighbors.   
In addition this dissertation project analyzes universities internal characteristics (namely 
their governance structure, mission, and wealth) to produce a more defined understanding of why 
there is innovation variance within a specific category of institutions.  The intention is to prove 
that the institutional differences within the universities play a major role in influencing, and 
ultimately determining, which policies are adopted.  Simply analyzing regional and state 
demographics presents an incomplete explanation to why some universities innovate at a greater 
rate than others.   
In sum, this dissertation will attempt to push the diffusion literature forward by 
introducing a new conceptualization of how innovations spread, while also focusing its attention 
to the institutions adopting the policies. 
1.6 METHODS OF INQUIRY AND FINDINGS 
To answer these questions the standard methodological technique in policy diffusion studies, 
event history analysis, is employed (Berry and Berry, 1990).  The statistically significant factors 
that affect the timing of when each university formally adopts each of the three policies – 
establishing a technology transfer office, initiating a comprehensive public capital campaign, and 
raising tuition - is determined.  The tested variables are divided into three primary subgroups: 
institutional level (i.e., university governance structure, wealth, size, etc.), state level (legislative 
professionalism, partisanship, etc.), and diffusion (regional and peer).  Following the standard 
procedures conducted in past diffusion studies, the regional diffusion variable is measured as the 
                                                 
3 The term “peer diffusion” has been mentioned in past diffusion studies, particularly in relation to professional 
networks (Gray 1973; Mintrom and Vergari 1998).  However for this dissertation the definition of “peer” is not 
simply similar actors in similar institutions, but similar actors in similar institutions of similar caliber.  This research 
introduces the important concepts of status and prestige when determining peer groups.  This distinction will be 
discussed in more detail within the dissertation. 
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proportion of universities that have adopted the policy in question prior to year t in the 
contiguous states to universityi.  Similarly, the peer diffusion variable is measured as the 
proportion of universities that have adopted the policy in question prior to year t in the same peer 
group to universityi.   
The results of the models clearly indicate that peer diffusion is a strong determinant in 
increasing the likelihood that a university will adopt a policy.  In terms of both the establishment 
of a technology transfer office and the initiation of a comprehensive capital campaign, the effect 
of peer diffusion is significant.  On the flip side, only in regards to raising tuition is regional 
diffusion found to be important. Additionally institutional level factors such as the presence of a 
medical school (for establishing a technology transfer office) and the university governance 
structure (for initiating a capital campaign and raising tuition) were found to be critical. 
However, the selected state-level variables had minimal effect in explaining the timing of the 
policy adoptions, raising a question about the true effect of state appropriations on university 
strategies. 
In addition to the quantitative model, this dissertation will answer the research question 
through a series of elite interviews with university administrators and faculty.  This supplement 
to the diffusion model follows the work of previous diffusion scholars who have uncovered 
through interviews the great importance of policy entrepreneurs in the eventual implementation 
of certain public policies (Kingdon, 1984; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Sabatier, 1999). The 
primary question is how influential are specific individuals in helping push an idea through an 
institutional bureaucracy.  Past research has shown that dramatic events sometimes open a 
window of opportunity for new political and institutional actors (or “policy entrepreneurs”), who 
previously remained on the sidelines, to enter into the policy debate and “insist on rewriting the 
rules, and on changing the balance of power that will be reinforced by new institutional 
structures” (Sabatier, 1999, 101).   The result is a change in the equilibrium of the policy domain 
and consequently a new set of policy options available to the institution.   This proves to be the 
reality in the four cases examined (University of Washington, Pittsburgh, Alabama-Birmingham, 
and Louisville), where an individual is identified through the interviews as the primary advocate 
for the establishment of a technology transfer office.  
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1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
To properly prove the hypothesis and fully explain the research design and results, the chapters 
of this dissertation are divided in the following manner.  The second chapter provides a more 
thorough examination of previous policy diffusion studies with an emphasis on those from the 
field of political science and several in the education field that have utilized universities in their 
research.  The third chapter delves deeper into the theoretical underpinnings of the diffusion 
process, while also highlighting the reasons they may not logically apply to universities.  
Additionally, the theory of normative isomorphism is introduced with an explanation of why it 
can be logically applied to universities.  The fourth chapter accomplishes two tasks.  First it 
describes the privatization policies (tuition, private fundraising, and research commercialization) 
that are used to test my diffusion models.  The historical evolution of the privatization policies is 
illustrated by highlighting specific pieces of education legislation that have helped define 
American public higher education, but now have been either altered or completely ignored.  This 
chapter also explains in detail all variables used, including how they were constructed, the 
theoretical reasoning for their addition, and past scholarly works that support their statistical 
significance.  The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters will present the quantitative results of the 
different models that have been constructed.  The eighth chapter presents the qualitative results 
of the elite interviews that were conducted with university administrators and decision makers to 
confirm the quantitative results. Finally, a general conclusion is drawn from the overall research 
and additional questions are raised regarding future scholarly work on this topic. 
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2.0  CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, it is to establish the definition of the diffusion 
process by using Rogers’ seminal book, Diffusion of Innovation (1962).  Rogers dissects each 
important step in the diffusion process providing a clear understanding of how innovations 
spread in a variety of social environments. The second goal of this chapter is to introduce in 
detail the early works of Walker (1969), Gray (1973), and Berry & Berry (1990), who 
collectively are recognized as the principle political scientists in the study of policy diffusion. 
Walker and Gray are credited for being two of the early scholars to apply Rogers’ theoretical 
construct to the legislative policies of the American states and confirming both the regional and 
internal determinants models.  Berry & Berry are acknowledged for introducing the 
methodological technique of event history analysis to policy diffusion research, which now is 
considered the standard tool for diffusion scholars. The last objective of this chapter is to 
highlight the most recent diffusion studies in both political science and higher education.  These 
more current works have helped broaden the field and better explain this social and political 
phenomenon. 
2.1 THE DEFINITION OF DIFFUSION 
To properly begin a study in policy diffusion it is necessary to establish the definition of the 
process.  It is to this objective that Rogers’ book, Diffusion of Innovation, is properly viewed by 
most social scientists as the seminal work on the topic due to its main contribution - solidifying 
the definition of diffusion by breaking down its four components (or “elements”): innovation, 
communication, time, and social systems.   
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According to Rogers, the concept of “innovation” can be best understood as the first step 
in the process of diffusion since it is equivalent to an “idea, practice, or object that is perceived 
as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (1962, 11).  This does not mean the innovation 
is necessarily “new” as defined by the amount of time since its creation, but that it is simply 
perceived as that by the potential adopter.  This is critical since many policies are not 
substantively original, but instead are typically old ideas that have either been slightly adjusted 
or applied to solve a new problem (Cyert and March, 1963). 
After the innovation has been cognitively observed by the potential adopters, the next 
step in the diffusion process is “communication”, where information pertaining to the innovation 
is shared and discussed amongst the participants.  The participants are typically a combination of 
actors who have past experience implementing the innovation and actors who are considering 
implementing it for the first time.  It is during this step of the process when questions are 
answered, concerns are alleviated, and ultimately an evaluation is conducted by those potential 
adopters.  Yet a mandatory component to the communication step is the existence of venues (or 
“channels”) where the participants can exchange their information, such as professional 
publications and conferences.   
The third element in the diffusion of innovations is the unit of “time”, which is often 
ignored by other types of policy research since they are typically only attempting to answer 
simple questions related to policy effects. However policy diffusion attempts to answer 
fundamental research questions about who are the policy leaders (entrepreneurs) versus 
followers (laggards), what is the rate of adoption, and when does an idea enter the cognitive 
mainstream of policy makers.   None of these questions could be properly addressed without 
taking into consideration the variable of time. 
The last element focuses on the importance of the “social system”, the “interrelated units 
that are engaged in joint problem-solving to accomplish a common goal” (1962, 23).  This is the 
formal group of participants who communicate amongst each other and generate new ideas to 
address their mutual issues.  Typically the social system (or ‘network’) is based on a profession 
(such as doctors) or according to a location (such as citizens of a specific municipality).  The 
critical criterion is an overarching problem that affects all members of the social system and 
helps bond them into this network of communication.   
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In sum, Rogers lays out the four fundamental components of the diffusion process 
(innovation, communication, time, and social system) and clearly identifies their characteristics, 
solidifying the definition of the social phenomenon and enabling future diffusion scholars to 
conduct more comprehensive research.   
2.2 SEMINAL DIFFUSION STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE  
One of the first political scientists to apply Rogers’ more refined definition of the diffusion 
process upon the American states was Jack Walker (1969).  Specifically, Walker raises the two 
fundamental questions that would become the basis for diffusion research within American 
politics - Why do some states innovate more rapidly? And how does innovation spread?   
To answer the first question Walker tests 88 different public policies and focuses on 
whether state political and demographic factors determine which states ultimately adopt the 
policies.   By constructing factor analysis scores for each state, Walker is able to uncover that 
variables such as wealth, education, and political ideology do have a strong correlation in 
determining which states implement specific policies.  This discovery is followed by raising the 
underlying question of “time”, and ascertaining how these demographic variables affect states’ 
rate of innovation.  Walker understands that to properly observe the phenomenon of diffusion, it 
is not enough to simply reveal the demographic factors, it is of equal importance to discern how 
these factors affect the length of time it takes some states to change.  It is to this end that Walker 
constructs an “innovation score” for each state by observing the average number of years it takes 
for each state government to adopt legislation, concluding that some states do innovate at a 
quicker rate dependent on its particular demographic characteristics. 
The conclusion about the importance of internal determinants, leads to the second 
fundamental question of how states innovate. Walker understands that a state legislator is under a 
difficult situation since he is asked “to choose among complex alternatives and constantly 
receiving much more information concerning his environment than he is able to digest and 
evaluate” (1969, 889).  This information overload causes the legislator to limit his policy options 
to only those that are familiar and/or convenient.   This is coupled with the economic fact that 
states are in competition with their regional neighbors for industries and citizens.  It is in this 
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context that Walker forwards his regionalism hypothesis that states will most likely emulate their 
neighbors in enacting specific policies. To test this theory, Walker divides the states into regional 
groupings and finds that geography is a significant factor in the eventual adoption of public 
policies.  Walker reveals a strong correlation between one state innovating and the other states 
within the grouping following suit soon there after. 
Yet even with Walker’s significant advances, Gray (1973) pushes the scholarly 
discussion further by challenging a few of Walker’s conclusions, most notably that certain states 
can be broadly labeled as more innovative.  Through a more focused experiment, Gray contends 
that the likelihood that a state will adopt a specific policy is much more sensitive to the type of 
policy in question and the timing of its emergence.  Gray analyzes 12 policies across three main 
policy segments (education, welfare, and civil rights) that tap into the socio-economic divide 
within the country.  Her findings confirm her hypothesis, revealing that when policies are 
disaggregated (as compared to Walker’s composite “innovation score”) the initial adopters vary 
depending on the type of policy that is being considered.  Gray’s research underlies the important 
fact that future diffusion studies must take into account the type of policy being analyzed in an 
effort to accurately conclude the reasoning for its rate of adoption by each individual state.  
In addition to refining Walker’s theories, Gray also introduces in her work the idea of a 
national interaction model where professionals learn about potential policies through the channel 
of “networks”.  Borrowing from Rogers’ fourth element (“social system”) to the diffusion 
process, Gray argues that state policy-makers become aware of possible public policy solutions 
through communication with their counterparts throughout the country.  She generates a simple 
algebraic model that assumes that policy-makers of non-adopting states interact with policy-
makers of adopting states through professional conferences, publications, and individual 
networks.  As interaction grows, the number of non-adopters will decline as they communicate 
more with adopters. The result is traditional ‘S’ curve where an acceleration of innovation occurs 
in the middle, while limited activity occurs in the beginning and end of the diffusion process. 
While Walker and Gray are rightfully viewed as the central figures of early diffusion 
work in American politics, their conclusions do have their limitations.  In particular their models 
treat the internal and external determinants as bifurcated variables.  In other words, their 
methodologies only allow a “single explanation” for policy adoption – either due to internal state 
factors or regional diffusion pressure.  Subsequently it is impossible to determine what 
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interaction maybe occurring between the two separate models.   Berry and Berry (1990) 
recognized this weakness and introduced the highly valuable method of event history analysis 
(EHA) to policy diffusion research.  Put simply, EHA “is a pooled method that requires annual 
observations on independent variables for each state over a period of years (1994, 443).  This 
methodological technique permits a scholar to observe both internal and external determinants in 
a single model and helps produce a much more comprehensive conclusion on the factors that 
affect policy diffusion.  Berry and Berry validated their methodology by observing the influence 
of both internal and regional affects on the diffusion of state lotteries (1990) and state taxes 
(1992).  Soon other political scientists were utilizing EHA and confirming the presence of state-
to-state diffusion in other policy areas.  The next section highlights some of the more recent 
works that have expanded on the ideas and methods forwarded by Walker, Gray, and Berry & 
Berry.  
2.3 RECENT RESEARCH IN POLICY DIFFUSION 
In as much as the introduction of the EHA technique pushed the diffusion literature forward over 
the last decade, other scholars have helped broaden the research by investigating other facets of 
this political phenomenon.  One of these facets that has more recently been investigated is the 
importance of policy entrepreneurs and the role they play in actively promoting policies for 
adoption (Mintrom1997).  Drawing from past research on the importance of policy entrepreneurs 
on agenda-setting (Kingdon 1984, Baumgartner and Jones 1993), diffusion scholars have found 
policy entrepreneurs to be highly consequential in the diffusion process since they help in 
identifying problems, uniting coalitions, and pushing specific policies onto the public agenda.   
Moreover, scholars have observed the critical importance of professional networks in assisting 
policy entrepreneurs in achieving their policy goals.  Following the early works of Gray (1973), 
diffusion scholars have delve deeper into the role networks play in disseminating information 
and garnering broad support for passage of specific legislation. Specifically, Mintrom and 
Vergari (1998) identified policy entrepreneurs and surveyed their utilization of networks, 
revealing that the existence of one significantly increased the probability of their policy being 
enacted.  It is in this context that the term, “peer” is used to describe the network of professionals 
 13 
in the same occupational field (128).  However there is no distinction between the caliber of the 
professionals or the institutions they serve, they are simply peers due to being in the same 
profession.  This is the key difference between this dissertation and past diffusion studies that 
have used the concept of peers.  For this research, the importance of how members in the same 
profession view each other in terms of their status and prestige plays a substantial role in 
determining the construction of their policy networks.   It is assumed that policy-makers will be 
more likely to communicate with other policy-makers that share similar status.  Conversely, 
policy-makers will be less likely to communicate with those of lesser stature within their 
occupational field.   
Other important areas that have recently been investigated in the study of policy diffusion 
include the reinvention processes policies go through as they are slightly altered by the adopting 
state governments (Glick and Hays 1991).  Traditionally, policies are assumed to be identical 
when being adopted by different states.  However research has shown that policies may change 
substantially as they proceed through the diffusion process and are implemented.  This 
phenomenon has profound implications on the affects of the policy including its results, costs, 
and affected citizenry. It has also been reveled that policies which are deemed successful in the 
eyes of politicians are much more likely to be emulated then those which are viewed as failures 
in accomplishing their main task (Volden 2006).   This may seem logical, but this distinction 
between perceived success and failure had simply been assumed in past studies.  Berry himself 
has pushed his work further by identifying, with the assistance of geographic information 
systems, the importance of size and location of specific populations in relation to the chances of 
policy adoption (Berry and Baybeck 2005). 
Since this dissertation is examining the decision-making process within universities, it is 
important to include valuable scholarly works in the field of higher education related to policy 
innovation.  One of these works is the analysis conducted by Hearn and Griswold (1994), who 
test the influence of states’ postsecondary governance structure on the probability of states 
adopting a series of policy innovations in higher education (i.e., assessments of undergraduate 
students, pre-paid college tuition plans, required testing for teaching assistants, etc).   The results 
show that governance structure does have a significant impact, specifically states with a more 
centralized structure tended to enact more stringent policies such as mandatory student 
assessments.  Building on these results, McLendon, Heller, and Young (2005) expand the 
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analysis by including interstate diffusion pressures and by doing so bridge the higher education 
research with policy diffusion.   Their results confirm the significant pressure of regionalism, 
finding strong diffusion effects when predicting policy adoption. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has briefly described some of the important scholarly studies of policy diffusion.  It 
is a field of study that is still in its early stages for political science and education.  Major strides 
have been made over the last few decades bringing greater clarity to the phenomenon and its 
determinants.  This dissertation plans on expanding it even further by delving deeper into the 
process of diffusion at the institutional level.  It should be noted that it is a process that has 
primarily been observed at the individual level (Rogers 1962) and at the state level (Walker 
1967; Gray 1972; Berry and Berry 1990).  This research raises the question about its relevance at 
the institutional level, specifically in regards to the policy-making decisions within universities.  
As discussed previously, do the theories constructed to explain innovation at the state level, 
apply appropriately to other public policy-making institutions at the institutional level.  This is 
one of the primary contributions that this dissertation will provide to the diffusion literature.  
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3.0  CHAPTER THREE: THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This dissertation addresses two identified shortcomings in the study of policy diffusion, both of 
which can be attributed to the narrow focus on state legislatures as the unit of analysis.  The first 
shortfall is the question of applicability of the contiguous-state theory to all policy-making public 
institutions. The theory states that decision-makers will most likely seek public policy solutions 
by examining the policies already implemented by their regional neighbors based on two 
fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that similar public institutions within a region 
are involved in an economic competition with each other for valuable resources such as 
industries, taxes, and productive citizens (Tiebout 1956).  The second assumption of the 
contiguous-state theory is that policy makers lack important information and resources to 
comprehensively examine all of the potential solutions to their issues and thus, for convenience, 
will engage in a form of “satisficing” (Simon 1976) by considering only regional policies.   
Based on these two critical assumptions, the end result of the contiguous-state theory is 
that regional institutions will homogenize over time as they adopt similar solutions to their public 
problems.  The question that remains is whether these overarching assumptions are applicable to 
all public or quasi-public policy-making institutions.   Is it true that all similar public institutions 
within a region compete with each other? Do all these institutions lack the vital information 
needed to engage in a more efficient and productive search for alternative ideas?   If these two 
assumptions do not logically apply to a particular institution, will the contiguous state theory still 
make sense?  
This dissertation focuses on a largely unstudied public policy-making institution, the 
university, as it relates to the diffusion of innovations.  It is argued here that the contiguous-state 
explanation is not generalizable to this institution because neither of the two aforementioned 
assumptions holds true. First, universities are not engaged in a regional competition for resources 
(i.e. faculty, students, and private funding), but instead are involved in a national or intra-state 
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competition for these valuable assets.  Second, universities possess valuable information about 
their competition through highly publicized annual rankings, which allows them to better 
maximize their policy options and reduce the need for satisficing. 
An alternative to the contiguous-state explanation is the theory that universities innovate 
based on the actions taken by their “peers”, schools that share similar levels of prestige and 
status.  This hypothesis is drawn primarily from the interrelated theories of professionalization 
and normative isomorphism developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The main idea of these 
two theories is that organizations with a professionally trained labor force from the same 
occupational field will be motivated to adopt the same policies as their competitors (peers) in an 
effort to ensure they provide the same benefits and services to their employees.    This chapter 
explains in detail why the normative isomorphism theoretical construct is more applicable to 
universities than the contiguous state theory. 
The second main part of this chapter addresses the lack of attention on the characteristics 
of the institution generating the policies.  Minimal emphasis has previously been placed in 
understanding how the specific arrangements and norms within the institution in question help 
determine which policies eventually get adopted.  Traditionally, the few institutional level 
variables tested by diffusion scholars have been legislative professionalism and partisanship.  
Again this limited analysis is due to the focus by political scientists on the institution of state 
legislatures, which lack substantial structural variance and transparency.  Here the question is 
asked: can a more in-depth list of institutional determinants reveal a more substantive 
explanation for policy adoption?   
The conclusion is that the utilization of universities as the unit of analysis allows for a 
more extensive examination on the affects of institutional factors in the policy making process.   
The wider variance in governance structure, missions, and rules within public universities creates 
a richer comparative study than state governments (Lowry 2001). The theoretical reasoning for 
shifting down from the state level to the institutional level is due to the conclusions drawn from 
normative and rational choice institutionalism, which assert that a fully specified model of policy 
outputs must include variables that tap into institutional rules or rule changes since they are 
typically the precursor toward policy outcomes (Peters, 1999).    
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two primary subchapters. The first is a more 
thorough explanation behind peer diffusion by delving deeper into the assumptions behind the 
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contiguous-state theory (regional economic competition and lack of information) and illustrating 
how they are not generalizable to public universities.   The second subchapter discusses the 
theoretical reasoning behind why a more thorough examination of the institutional rules and 
norms is needed.  Lastly the conclusion provides an explanation on why one of the more 
renowned theories applied to universities, the garbage can theory (Cyert, March, and Winter 
1964; Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972), is not pertinent to this research.  Plus, it will summarize 
the theoretical logic behind my models.  
3.1 THEORETICAL REASONING FOR PEER DIFFUSION  
3.1.1 False Assumption #1: Regional Competition 
As discussed, one of the main assumptions of the contiguous-state theory is that similar policy 
making institutions are in competition with their regional neighbors due to economic 
competitiveness for vital resources.  This conclusion is drawn directly from the economic theory 
of Charles Tiebout (1956), who states that if different communities provide different levels of 
public goods and services, citizens will reveal their preferences by moving to the community that 
best fits their needs (or as it is more commonly known, “voting with their feet”).   This in turn 
will generate competition amongst communities, who will react by adopting similar public 
policies so as to not lose citizens.  As Tiebout notes, “the consumer-voter may be viewed as 
picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods…the 
consumer-voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of 
preferences.  The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, 
the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position” (1956, 418).  
Naturally this theory can be applied to other valuable entities that do not want to be lost by 
communities such as industries and federal funding. 
Policy diffusion scholars have applied the underpinnings of this economic theory to state 
politics and have routinely found it to be statistically significant in explaining innovations within 
regions.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Walker was one of the first to recognize this 
correlation when he introduced his factor analysis scores and found that states within a certain 
 18 
regional area tended to adopt similar policies over time (1969).   For example he identified that 
when the state government of Massachusetts adopted a policy to increase elementary school 
spending, it increased the likelihood of the other New England states to enact the same policy 
shortly thereafter. A similar result arose with an array of public policies and different “clusters” 
of states.   This finding was further validated by other notable policy diffusion scholars including 
Gray (1972), Berry & Berry (1990), and Mooney & Lee (1995).   In all cases the underlying 
assumption was that regionalism mattered because contiguous state governments were in 
competition with each other for identical resources. 
However not all public or quasi-public institutions are truly in competition with their 
regional neighbors for the same resources.  In the case of public research universities, the 
competition for valuable resources (i.e. faculty, students, and government funding) is either at 
the national or intra-state level, not at the inter-state level.  Academic departments do not simply 
rely on the local graduate programs to recruit junior faculty, nor do they seek to pry senior 
faculty members from only neighboring institutions.  Instead national searches (sometimes even 
international) are conducted based on the candidate’s record on research and teaching as the 
primary criteria (Bok 2003, 25).  If, for example, the contiguous-state theory was applicable to 
universities, the political science department at the University of California at Los Angeles 
would conduct their faculty search by simply contacting the University of Arizona, Nevada, or 
Oregon for candidates. Instead, faculty searches are primarily conducted by interviewing only 
those candidates from institutions of similar or higher caliber (Bok, 2003). 
The same can be said regarding the competition for research funding.  The process is not 
conducted at the regional level; instead it is performed at the federal level.  Researchers in the 
same discipline tend to apply for the same national grants and fellowships irregardless of where 
their home university maybe situated (Leslie and Slaughter, 1997).  While maybe there are some 
funding opportunities that are restricted to a certain region, the monetary value of these grants 
pale in comparison to the national organizations and federal governmental departments who 
allocate hundreds of millions of dollars a year in support of academic research (Slaughter and 
Leslie 1997, 76-77).   
Lastly, in regards to recruiting students, inter-state competition is relatively minimal 
compared to intra-state recruitment for most public universities. This is primarily because most 
public universities are legally bound to educate their local citizenry before opening their 
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admission doors to out-of-state students (Geiger, 2004).   This results in the vast majority of 
public research universities filling their classes with students from their home state, while only a 
small percentage comes from other states.4   This holds true even for the largest public research 
universities that describe themselves as “national universities” (Geiger 2004, 81).  For example 
at the University of Pittsburgh, which is considered a national institution, less than one quarter of 
their undergraduate enrollment is from outside of Pennsylvania.  In fact, none of the public 
research universities has a majority of its undergraduate enrollment hailing from outside of their 
home state (NCES). Taken all together, the assumption that institutions are in competition with 
their regional neighbors is not justified. 
3.1.2 False Assumption #2: Incomplete Information 
A second element to the contiguous state theory is that state governments will be more likely to 
look to their regional neighbors for policy solutions because they lack the comprehensive 
information needed to efficiently investigate the wider spectrum of potential solutions to their 
specific public policy problems. A search for appropriate solutions to complicated public policy 
problems necessitates an extensive amount of detailed information about both the array of policy 
options and the governments implementing them, and for most state legislators the act of 
collecting this information is too expensive in terms of both time and money.  The result is a lack 
of cognitive understanding of their policy options.  This political reality forces public officials to 
engage in a form of “satisficing” (Simon 1957), where they identify only solutions that are 
satisfactory to the majority and not necessarily solutions that maximize their situation.  This 
limited search for solutions typically translates into only looking at neighboring states since they 
have similar demographics and connected political networks (Mintrom and Vergari 1998).   This 
theoretical construct is derived from the research in behavioral economics conducted by Herbert 
Simon (1957). 
Most economic models assume that individuals act rationally and make decisions with 
the primary objective of maximizing their preferences (North, 1990).  As a result the “best” 
                                                 
4 The competition for students on a national scale has recently heightened as more universities attempt to recruit 
highly accomplished high schools students with merit scholarships in an effort to improve their rankings.  This 
recent policy should be tested in future diffusion studies. 
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policy to achieve this objective will be chosen in an effort to bring about the optimal outcome.  
However, Simon raises doubts to this assumption since in many scenarios individuals do not 
seek to optimize their situation, but instead make a choice that is simply acceptable to them, but 
few economists have taken the time to examine this phenomenon (1959). Simon notes that most 
economists simply, “assume that the economic actor is rational, and hence he makes strong 
predictions about human behavior without performing the hard work of observing 
people…which carries with it the implication that only the rational survive” (254). 
However according to Simon’s observations, rather than seeking the best solution to 
maximize their preferences, individuals select solutions that simply satisfy their goals.  Simon 
identifies numerous situations where this is observed including problem solving and making 
financial decisions (1959).   
The follow-up question is why do individuals not necessarily seek the option that 
maximizes their gains?  For an individual to seek their ideal solution, they must be aware of its 
existence or willing to accept the costs searching for it.  The reality is that most firms and 
individuals make decisions in an environment of uncertainty. They do not fully comprehend the 
impetus of their problem, the market they are engaged in, or the competition they are facing.  
Therefore they do not possess the pertinent information necessary to select the optimal choice.  
Compounding the problem are the economic constraints of costs (in terms of time, money, or 
reputation) that may be incurred while trying to identify the optimal solution.  To engage in a 
lengthy search is an expensive proposition that most organizations are unwilling to accept.  The 
end result is enacting solutions that are based on a perspective of “bounded rationality” and not 
full rationality as assumed by traditional economic theory (Cyert and March, 1963).     
An argument can be made that universities make decisions in an environment of greater 
certainty than state governments primarily due to the assistance of highly publicized annual 
rankings, such as the U.S. News and World Report.  University rankings act as a heuristic for 
university administrators, efficiently identifying their peer (and aspiration) institutions.   This 
valuable information allows university administrators to evaluate with greater precision the 
potential policies that are more ideal for their specific institution.  The assumption being that 
peer institutions are dealing with similar issues under similar constraints as compared to the 
issues of other universities that are either of lower or higher caliber.  In essence, the rankings 
serve to simplify for decision-makers the complex process of determining which policies are best 
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for their institution (Ehrenberg 2002).5  It should be noted that the argument is not that 
universities possess full information when making policy decisions.  Universities, like all 
institutions, make choices based on incomplete information and uncertain outcomes. Instead the 
argument is simply they have more information than state governments, and thus do not need to 
engage in the act of satisficing to the same degree.6   
A critic may raise the fact that this argument understates the dramatic changes that have 
occurred over the last couple of decades in terms of the methods and the amount of information 
state governments and agencies can accumulate.  It can be argued that state agencies have a 
much greater ability to access information and learn about policy options than they did in the 
past due to the recent creation of rankings such as the CQ State Fact Finder: Rankings Across 
America and the State Rankings Annual, the increased level of professionalization within the 
field of government, and the expanded use of the internet.  These mechanisms decrease the costs 
of accumulating information and reduce the need to satisfice as previously theorized, the end 
result being that state agencies possess the same level of information about their peer institutions 
as universities.  This argument does have some merit; however the contiguous state theory 
remains the prominent theory with the diffusion literature, and thus an appropriate place to start 
this research.  It is important to see how well the theory explains the diffusion of policy ideas 
within higher education.  If the results are less than impressive, it opens the door for testing 
alternative diffusion explanations, such as effect of peer pressure.   
With that being said, the contiguous-state theory possesses two underlying assumptions 
(regional economic competition and incomplete information) that do not completely apply to 
universities.  On the contrary, universities are engaged in an economic competition at the 
national and intra-state levels.  Moreover university administrators possess information through 
                                                 
5 Recently scholars have begun to investigate how much attention university administrators give to the annual 
rankings.  Evidence has shown that while the rankings receive criticism from administrators for their inaccuracies 
and methodological mistakes, they nonetheless spend a tremendous amount of time analyzing them and utilizing 
them as a reference.  Ehrenberg (2002) in particular reveals the extensive efforts some colleges engage in to improve 
their rankings, including focusing almost solely on the variables that are included in the U.S. News and World 
Report models. 
6 This conclusion is also supported by the anecdotal answers provided by the state legislator and university 
administrators interviewed for this dissertation (see Chapter 8).  When asked to identify their competition in the field 
of higher education, the state legislator was not able to identify a specific cluster of states. He was unaware of the 
different policies other states were enacting or knew of any trends regarding Pennsylvania students enrolling in other 
states' institutions of higher education.   However when the same question was presented to the university 
administrators, they were able to easily identify the cluster of schools considered their competition.  Not incidentally 
theses schools happened to be in the same tier as them. 
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the annual rankings that works as a heuristic to engage in a more efficient search for appropriate 
policies.  So if the contiguous-state theory is not particularly applicable then what can help 
explain innovations within universities?   The next subchapter forwards the theory of normative 
isomorphism and professionalization to explain policy diffusion among universities.   
3.1.3 Normative Isomorphism and Professionalization 
While DiMaggio and Powell are not policy diffusion scholars, they too seek an answer to the 
question underlying policy diffusion studies - why do certain organizations homogenize?  It is in 
this context that they forward their theory of isomorphic change. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
agree with the notion that competing organizations which encounter a similar set of economic 
and social conditions begin a process of homogenization (or “isomorphism”) that result in a 
parallel movement toward identical innovations.  As they state, “isomorphism is a constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (149). They further expand the argument by asserting that there are 
three different mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs, each with 
their own antecedents.   
The first two isomorphic changes are coercive and mimeric isomorphism.  Coercive 
changes occur when both formal and informal pressures are placed on an organization, primarily 
from the exogenous force of cultural expectations from society. This societal expectation 
typically comes in the form of government mandates.  A classic example is the environmental 
controls placed on manufacturers and their factories. Whereas society has created an expectation 
regarding the condition of their environment, the government is responding through legislation 
and regulations.  In the end all manufacturers homogenize because they are complying with the 
environmental restrictions placed upon them. 
Mimeric isomorphism is caused by uncertainty as compared to coercion.  In this case, 
organizations homogenize because they have limited knowledge of other alternatives, thus they 
simply look to each other for guidance.  This form of isomorphism is strongly connected the idea 
of bounded rationality which is discussed above (Simon 1959).  In both cases the underlying 
question is how do organizations behave when they lack vital information and are in an 
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environment of uncertainty?  The general answer is that they copy each other regardless of 
whether that is the most rational decision in terms of maximizing their preferences. 
The last mechanism DiMaggio and Powell identify, and the most important for this 
dissertation, is normative isomorphism.  In this process of isomorphism organizations begin to 
innovate in a similar fashion because internalized norms within the institutions exert pressure on 
them to homogenize. Compared to coercive and mimeric isomorphism, normative isomorphism 
is more about endogenous decisions than exogenous forces.  One of the critical components to 
the process of normative isomorphism is its antecedent – professionalization.  Professionalization 
is defined by DiMaggio and Powell as the “collective struggle of members of an occupation to 
define the conditions and methods of their work, to control the production of producers, and to 
establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (1983, 152).  To put 
it another way, professionalization is the process where members of a specific occupational field 
insert authority over the definition and process of their occupation. This process of 
professionalization is accomplished by three particular means. The first is through the “hiring of 
individuals from firms within the same industry (and) through the recruitment of fast-track staff 
from a narrow range of training institutions” (152).  The attention to where employees are being 
trained and educated is critical to the normative isomorphic process because is allows specific 
norms and values to be ingrained in each of the individuals as they go through the training 
process.  As DiMaggio and Powell note, “such mechanisms create a poll of almost 
interchangeable individuals who…possess a similarity of orientation and disposition that may 
override variation in tradition and control that might otherwise shape organizational behavior 
(ibid).    
The second means by which professionalization develops within an occupational field is 
through “common promotion practices” (ibid).  In this scenario, individuals within an occupation 
uniformly understand the specific attainments that must be achieved for promotions within the 
field.   These attainments are highly transferable across all organizations and institutions within 
the field since they are broadly recognized as the measurements by which every professional is 
judged.  This also generates a clear hierarchy within the occupational field since the 
accomplishments of all the employees are understood and easily translated.   
The last mechanism is a skill-level requirement for particular jobs. In essence, there is a 
filter to determine which individuals possess the necessary education and background to enter 
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into the occupational field.  This mechanism is highly correlated with the second means by 
which professionalization is created since the skill-level requirement often dictates “the entry 
level and the career progression (of) the individuals” (ibid).  Similar to the other mechanisms of 
the professionalization process, the requirements are clearly understood by all members of the 
occupation and by those who want to gain entry. 
Taken together, these mechanisms define a broad range of different occupational fields 
including higher education.  Based on the definitions provided by DiMaggio and Powell, 
universities are clearly “professionalized” since they accurately fulfill the requirements, 
particularly as it relates to faculty recruitment, hiring, and the tenure process.  Faculty at major 
research universities tend to come from a relatively select and “narrow range of training 
institutions”. It is not uncommon for academic departments, regardless of field, to be dominated 
by faculty from the traditional research university conferences such as the Ivy League and the 
Big-10.  It is also the case that the tenure track process is run in a similar fashion regardless of 
university.  Even though some universities may have slightly different requirements for 
proceeding through the promotional process, there is enough overlap that most professors can 
transfer from one institution to another with their promotional process still intact. Lastly, the 
expectations and assessments placed on all faculty is primarily done by peers and fellow 
academics, which internally establishes the “skills requirement” for success in the profession.   
Again, similar to the promotion expectation, the expected skill that each professor (or aspiring 
professor) is to possess is deeply engrained in the understanding of the members within the field.  
Collectively these distinct personnel practices leads to a highly restricted pool of professionals 
who share common ideas, goals, and policies.   
DiMaggio and Powell note that once an occupational field has been professionalized the 
normative isomorphic pressure begins to build.  Specifically,” organizational fields that include a 
large professionally trained labor force will be driven primarily by status competition. 
Organizational prestige and resources are key elements in attracting professions. This process 
encourages homogenization as organizations seek to ensure that they can provide the same 
benefits and services as their competitors (1993, 1554)”.  Consequently, they share information 
only amongst each other and rarely to individuals/organizations that are considered to be outside 
their domain. The eventual result is a well “recognized hierarchy of status…that becomes a 
matrix for information flows and personnel movement across organizations (1983, 153)”.  In 
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other words professionalization generates peer groups, which become the main source of 
information amongst its members.  This is the critical point in the theoretical reasoning for peer 
diffusion.   Based on the description presented by DiMaggio and Powell, universities are ideal 
institutions to validate their theoretical claim.  Hence this dissertation illustrates how the 
likelihood of policy adoption increases if the innovation has been implemented by a peer 
member.     
3.2 THEORETICAL REASONING FOR INSTITUTIONAL  RULES, NORMS, AND 
ARRANGEMENTS 
One of the striking weaknesses in the policy diffusion literature is the lack of attention that 
scholars have given to the internal dynamics (e.g. the rules, norms, arrangements) within the 
specific institution adopting the innovations and ascertaining how they might affect which 
policies eventually become implemented.   Minimal effort has been made to extensively 
investigate the institutional structure that decision makers have to abide by when considering 
their policy options.   Walker himself warned of this need when he stated that his theoretical 
construct “directs our attention to the rules for decision employed  by policy makers, rather than 
their formal group affiliation or their relative power or authority, and thus enables us to offer 
useful explanations of all policy decisions…(1969, 63)”.  As noted in the Chapter 2, the “internal 
determinants model” that has been popularly utilized in past diffusion studies, typically employs 
only variables that tap into the partisanship and professionalism of each state legislature.    
One of the main arguments of this dissertation is that it is not enough to simply take into 
consideration a legislator’s party affiliation and level of professionalism when trying to discern 
what institutional dynamics influence policy decisions.  A more comprehensive investigation 
into the institutional rules and arrangements that help generate viable policy options is needed to 
bolster the literature. This sentiment should be heeded due to the fact that substantial research in 
the field of both normative and rational choice institutionalism has asserted that a fully specified 
model of policy outputs must include variables that tap into institutional rules or rule changes 
since they are typically the precursor toward policy outcomes.  This is a particularly important 
proposition for this research since the debate surrounding the university policies being examined 
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(rising tuition, increasing private fundraising, and generating more commercially viable research) 
is whether their adoption is due to a change in values (normative institutionalism) or a reaction to 
a more competitive fiscal environment (rational choice institutionalism).  The following 
subchapters provide more detail about these twp types of institutionalism. 
3.2.1 Normative Institutionalism 
Normative institutionalism is a response to the rational choice assumption that actors within an 
institution make calculated choices to maximize their perceived gains.  The normative 
institutionalism argument is that actually, actors within an institution will feel restricted to some 
degree to make choices according to the norms and formal rules of the institutions (Cohen, 
March and Olsen, 1972).  Put in another way, to fully comprehend the outputs of an institution, 
one must be aware of the “rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations 
between roles and situations” (March and Olsen, 1989, 21-22).  It is these rules that define the 
institution, which in turn determines the behavior and ultimately the decisions of the policy 
makers.  An institution is not defined by a tangible structure, but is defined by a relatively secure 
set of accepted practices, which creates an environment where individuals learn about what is 
expected of them.  Once these “norms” are internalized, they bring legitimacy to the goals and 
direction of the institution, while simultaneously delegitimizing alternative ideas that could 
modify the direction.  The result is that policy-makers within the institution are limited in 
considering only those options that are in accordance with the “logic of appropriateness” 
embedded within the institution (March and Olsen 1989).  Administrators within the institution 
do not have an infinite list of policy options; instead it is a defined list of acceptable practices 
that fit within the parameters of appropriateness for the institution.  This has been proven in a 
variety of institutions including the Senate (Mathews 1973), the House (Asher 1973), and public 
safety (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).  In each case the rules were found to be statistically 
significant in determining which policies eventually were enacted.   
This concept has also been found to be relevant within a university structure based on the 
work of Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972).  In this seminal scholarly study known as the “garbage 
can theory”, universities are identified as “organized anarchies” due to the presence of three 
principle characteristics – fluid participation, unclear goals, and undefined processes.  The result 
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is that universities typically have high turnover amongst its senior officials and faculty do not 
possess a clear understanding of the ultimate mission and role they play in the institution’s 
achievement. Simply, ambiguity and uncertainty reign over the entire institution.  This 
environment is particularly troublesome when institutional problems arise and solutions need to 
be identified, since most administrators are unsure how to address them.  As a default, university 
administrators simply revert to policies that were utilized in the past since they already qualify 
within the parameters of the institution’s logic of appropriateness.7   This theory is connected to 
Simon’s construct of satisficing.  In both theories the overwhelming environment of uncertainty 
creates a limited examination of policy solutions.8   
 It is clearly important for policy diffusion scholars to uncover these norms when 
attempting to understand why some policies are adopted by specific institutions while other 
policies get ignored.   This dissertation attempts to achieve this objective by including the 
institutional variables of the Carnegie classification and land grant mission in the quantitative 
models. Both of these variables are strong indicators of the academic priority to basic research.  
In addition the norms and rules are discussed within the context of the elite interviews with 
university administrators (see Chapter 8). 
3.2.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Compared to normative institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism argues that examining 
the structure of the institution in question is critical when trying to comprehend policy adoption 
since the individuals within the institution will continue to act as rational actors, seeking the best 
outcome for themselves while at the same time, the structural arrangements of the institution will 
limit some of their options and greatly affect the potential outcome.  As Douglas North notes, 
                                                 
7 While Cohen, March, and Olson apply their theory also to universities, it should not be viewed so narrowly.  The 
“garbage can theory” can be applied to a multitude of institutions that posses the attributes of an “organized 
anarchy”. 
8 A skeptic may claim that this assertion by Cohen, March, and Olsen conflicts with the earlier claim that university 
administrators possess valuable information through the annual rankings, and thus make policy decisions in an 
environment of greater certainty.   The rebuttal to this claim is that Cohen, March, and Olsen’s theory is primarily 
concerned with the internal workings of a university – the working relationship and communication between 
administrators and faculty.  On the other hand, the argument about the benefit of the annual rankings is primarily 
connected to the external workings of a university – how they perceive themselves in relation to their peer 
institutions.  Thus both assertions about a university’s environment can be valid. 
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“the formal and informal rules and the type and effectiveness of enforcement shape the whole 
character of the game” (1990, 4). It is this theoretical argument that is the main thrust behind the 
idea of “bounded rationality” (Peters 1999, 44).  The options that an individual can consider are 
restricted and thus their ability to maximize their utilities must be done through the confines of 
the institution. A considerable amount of research has been conducted by political scientists to 
confirm this concept of bounded rationality, particularly in the subfield of legislative studies.    
In legislative research, one of the overarching questions raised by scholars is what 
enforces individual legislators to remain relatively stable in their policy decisions?  In other 
words, what are the factors that keep traditional legislative coalitions intact?  This is a 
fundamental puzzle in legislative politics since theories of social choice assume that there are 
almost always alternative policies that could garner a majority of support from a new composite 
of legislators (Shepsle and Weingast, 1995).  However, these alternative policies rarely get 
considered or have the opportunity to be discussed and the question is - why?  One of the 
strongest indicators revealed in  a number of studies are the rules that dictate the structure and 
procedures of the House.  These rules constrain the individual legislators into conforming within 
the institution of the House; it in essence has bounded their individualistic rational behavior. This 
has been confirmed in relation to the agenda-setting capabilities of the House leadership (Shepsle 
and Weingast, 1994), political parties (Cox and McCubbins 1993), and legislative committees 
(Sinclair 1994). In sum, these cases expose how the legislative rules and procedures heavily 
determine which policies see the light of day and which never make it out onto the House floor.  
Thus it is vital for future diffusion research to thoroughly examine institutional design when 
attempting to understand policy adoption.   
Many scholars in the education field (and a few in political science) have already 
ventured in this direction as it relates to the governance structure within public research 
universities. As mentioned earlier, American public universities are overseen by a variety of 
different structural arrangements.  Some are governed with a heavy influence of state oversight, 
while others rely more heavily on internal administrative supervision.  Researchers have tested 
this variation in governance structure and have found that the degree of state involvement does 
ultimately affect the type of higher education policy that eventually becomes implemented.  
Some of the more notable examples include tuition prices (Lowry 2001), resource allocations 
(Knott and Payne 2004), and performance assessments (McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005. 
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This dissertation continues in this scholarly direction and by focuses on capturing the differences 
in autonomy levels, missions, academic offerings, and wealth that are embedded within 
American higher education.   
In sum, this research follows the lessons learned by both normative and rational choice 
institutionalism and includes independent variables that capture the norms, rules and structure of 
universities.  This will provide a more complete understanding of the institutional-level 
determinants that potentially affect the type and timing of policy adoption. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented the theoretical reasoning behind a desire to expand the current policy 
diffusion literature be considering the influence of peer diffusion.  DiMaggio and Powell’s 
conceptualization of normative isomorphic change and the importance of professionalization 
(1983) have proven that “organizational fields that include a large professionally trained labor 
force will be driven primarily by status competition” (153).  In other words, some organizations 
homogenize due to peer pressure – a desire to remain competitive with those who share identical 
levels of prestige.  This is the underlying logic to why it makes theoretical sense to test the 
importance of peer influence.  Additionally, past scholarship in both normative and rational-
choice institutionalism, stresses the importance of testing institutional level determinants when 
trying to understand specific policy outputs.  
Chapter 4 presents an explanation of the privatization movement, providing insight into 
the reasons why the particular policies were chosen for this study.   In addition, the 
operationalization of the variables tested in the models is presented.  In particular, an explanation 
of how each policy was constructed and how each is predicted to influence university decision-
makers. 
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4.0  CHAPTER FOUR: VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
This dissertation asks the question – how do higher education policies diffuse? Specifically, it 
looks at the determinants that influence university decision-makers to adopt policies that may 
alter their institutional mission.  The hypothesis suggested here is that there are two critical 
factors that influence university policy diffusion: (1) The decisions of a university’s peer 
institutions and (2) the university’s distinct rules and arrangements.  This chapter presents the 
three dependent variables used to represent the institutional innovation: raising tuition, increasing 
private fundraising, and establishing a technology transfer office. As noted earlier, innovations 
are ideas that are viewed as new to the prospective institution and will presumably alter its 
direction and eventual output (Rogers, 1962).  Each of these variables is particularly well suited 
for study within the diffusion model because their adoption signifies a clear change in the 
behavior of a public university.  This behavioral change is described by scholars as the 
“privatization” of public universities which will be described more fully in the following pages.  
The adoption of the privatization policy by a university as indicated by the adoption of 
the three policies described above can be identified by using an extensive series of independent 
variables that have been categorized into three separate groupings – diffusion variables, 
institutional variables, and state variables.   The diffusion variables are used in two separate 
models.  The first model is the standard contiguous-state approach that has been developed and 
implemented by past diffusion scholars, where it is assumed that university administrators will 
be influenced by the policies implemented by their regional counterparts.  In this model each 
university is simply grouped with those universities that are geographically adjacent to it and the 
diffusion is measured as the proportion of universities who have adopted the policy in question 
prior to year t in the contiguous states to universityi.  Analogously, peer diffusion is constructed 
by clustering universities based on their average annual rankings and the diffusion is measured as 
the proportion of universities who have adopted the policy in question prior to year t in the same 
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peer group to university.  This unconventional model supplements the standard diffusion 
perspective of regionalism as a source for policy learning. 
The institutional variables attempt to capture the link between adopting specific policies 
and the diverse rules and arrangements of America’s public research universities.  Does it matter 
whether a university has a medical school? What is the affect does of the governance structure 
that oversees the university as far as the types of policies implemented within the institution? 
Does a land grant institution’s historical focus on research still influence the decisions made by 
university administrators? These are the types of questions that the wide array of institutional 
variables attempt to answer in relation to policy choices. It is within this category of variables 
that the research presented here delves deeper into the workings at the institutional level than 
have been previously studied.   
Lastly, state variables are determinants that tap into the political and population 
demographics of each state.  Past diffusion research has methodically taken into consideration 
the variance in wealth and partisanship of the American states and has analyzed how these 
differences affect the types of policies adopted by state legislatures.  While it is questionable that 
these variables influence university decisions, it would be negligent to exclude them because of 
their importance in the wider diffusion literature. 
This chapter also provides greater detail about the variables described above and explains 
why each variable has been included in this study, how the variable was constructed, and a 
hypothesis on how each variable may (or may not) significantly affect a university’s decision to 
implement one of the privatization policies presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief 
specification of the units of analysis (American public research universities) detailing who and 
how they were selected. 
4.1 THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 
In its simplest and most common definition, privatization is the shift from public financing of a 
policy toward a heavier reliance on private sources.  Instead of the cost of a policy being diffused 
amongst the general public, the shift places the financial burden more squarely on the individuals 
reaping the benefits from the policy itself.  As Paul Peterson explains, “it is a policy that is 
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modified from one which allocates resources to individuals and groups in the population in 
reverse proportion to their contribution in taxes… to one which those who benefit from the 
policy pay for the full cost” (Peterson 1979, 294).9 This shift is typically motivated by a desire 
on the part of political officials to reduce costs, increase accountability, and provide greater 
political flexibility (Peterson and Rom 1990). The general thinking is that individuals benefiting 
from a “privatized” policy will take greater ownership of it, thus reducing its costs to the public 
and limiting the political risk incurred by political leaders. The movement of privatization has 
been noted in numerous state policy domains ranging from welfare (Peterson, 1995) to medical 
care (Starr, 1980) to the arts (Hart, 1984).   
More recently it has also been associated with public higher education, where a larger 
share of the operating costs has been accrued by the individuals directly linked to the institution.  
Instead of the majority of revenue coming from the general public via taxes, a growing share is 
coming from students, alumni, and corporations (Lyall and Sell, 2006).  Most education 
advocates blame the reduction of state appropriations for this financial shift (Dennison, 2003). 
Other critics have focused on the internal decisions made by university administrators to become 
more entrepreneurial as a critical factor to the privatization movement (Bok, 2003).  This 
dissertation examines both potential explanations. 
4.1.1 Decline in State Appropriations 
As previously noted, the share of state budgets directed toward higher education has dramatically 
declined over the last twenty years (see Figure 4.1). 
 
                                                 
9 Although it should be noted that Peterson uses a different terminology when describing the policy shift   Rather 
than describing it as a shift to privatization, Peterson describes it as a shift from a distributive policy to a 
developmental one.  However the basic premise and result are the same. 
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Figure 4.1: State’s Budget to Higher Education (Source: NCES 2002) 
  
 
This reduction in public support has been uniformly opposed by education scholars, 
administrators, and policy-makers, who have accused state legislators of absolving themselves 
from their responsibility of adequately supporting public institutions of higher education. Instead 
of viewing the value of higher education “to the long-term welfare of communities made up of 
informed citizens actively participating in the democratic process”, legislators have begun 
treating it like “any other public utility (demanding) the most effective service at the most 
affordable price” (NEA, 2004).   The expectation that higher education institutions must serve 
the public good is rooted in the historical relationship between public universities and state 
governments that was first established with the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862.   
Prior to the creation of the Morrill Act, higher education institutions in America were 
primarily supported and administered by private citizens and religious sects.  Both the federal 
and state governments played only small roles in the higher education system because of 
financial constraints and greater attention to elementary education.  However both citizens and 
politicians grew concerned that the existing universities were not addressing the educational 
needs of the masses by providing curriculum in vocational subjects that were becoming critically 
important to America’s expanding agricultural economy, such as agriculture and mechanics,.  As 
a result Congress passed the Morrill Act of 1862 which legislated that each state was to be given 
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30,000 acres of public land for each senator and representative in Congress and the proceeds 
from the sale of the land were to be used to establish colleges “to teach such branches of learning 
as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the states 
may respectively prescribe” (Heller, 2001, 134).  The effects of the Morrill Act were immediate 
for it not only created research universities focused on subject matter essential to America’s 
burgeoning economy, it also formally enacted the fiscal relationship between government and 
higher education.   After the passage of the Morrill Act, it was accepted that government at both 
the federal and state level were to act as financial agents for the institutions – an agreement 
fortified over the past century and a half.   
There are many in the field of education that believes that this agreement has been 
undermined with the curtailment in state appropriations. They believe that this in turn forced 
public universities to seek alternative revenue sources, such as larger financial contributions 
from students, alumni, and corporate-sponsored research.   While these three providers have 
always played a role in financing institutions of higher education, their more profound role in 
recent times has raised these concerns.    
4.1.2 Entering the Marketplace 
There are other education scholars for whom the reduction in state appropriations does not fully 
explain the growing transformation into private enterprises.  As former Harvard President, Derek 
Bok, states, “declining appropriations may have played a part, but something more is surely 
required to explain the rise of entrepreneurial activity on American campuses during the last 
twenty years (2003, 9). For many of these scholars, the other significant influence on 
privatization has been the institutional decisions by university administrators to more actively 
enter the private marketplace to generate more resources.   
During the late 1970s and early1980s the United States, along with many other 
industrialized nations, saw their percentage of the global market decline due to significant 
competition from Asian countries within the Pacific Rim.   One of the ways that American 
companies and politicians responded to this new and troublesome reality was by turning to 
research universities to find and help create the newest products to compete in the global market 
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(Slaughter and Leslie 1997).  Fortunately businesses found the universities to be a welcoming 
partner because at the same time faculty and researchers were experiencing for the first time a 
decline in government appropriations and were actively seeking alternative funding sources.   
Government, both at the state and federal level, was dealing with the burgeoning costs of 
entitlement programs that were consuming a growing percentage of their budgets (Geiger 2004).   
This adversely affected the government supported grants and fellowships that most scholars had 
relied on in the past to fund their research.  The fiscal crunch made it appealing for many faculty 
members to partner with American corporations.  Many departments soon found that a large 
segment of their faculty members were entrenched in the inter-workings of the corporate world.  
As an example, one university administrator noted, “biology was a basic science whose faculty 
were concerned primarily with performing research for the National Science Foundation and 
authoring papers for scholarly conferences…but by the mid 1980s, most full professors of 
molecular biology held equity positions in spinoff companies that sold products to large 
corporations” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 6).  Naturally this transformation had monumental 
ripple affects throughout the university.  Most notably it pushed research and faculty into the 
competitive world of the marketplace and inevitably reprioritized institutional goals to match the 
needs of industry.  As a result many top scholars found themselves in the middle of high priced 
bidding wars between institutions.  Salaries and benefits that were incomprehensible only a few 
years before were suddenly being offered.   
This “arms race” mentality has only increased over the last twenty years and has spread 
into other facets of higher education including the recruitment of high achieving students 
(Goodchild et al., 1997) and wealthy donors (Geiger, 2004).  Naturally this spending spree has 
caused significant financial strain on many universities and, according to some education 
experts, this is the real reason public universities have had to seek additional revenue sources 
from students, alumni, and corporations (Yeager et al., 2001)   
Whether the privatization movement is due to a decline in state appropriations or 
alternatively due to entry into the private marketplace, the result is a growing shift in raising 
revenue from students, alumni, and corporations. This shift to privatization can be easily 
observed in the form of three increasingly popular policies – raising tuition, increasing private 
fundraising, and producing more commercially viable research through the establishment of a 
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technology transfer office (Dillion, 2005).  The following sections discuss each policy and how 
each dependent variable was constructed. 
4.1.3 DV #1: Establishing a Technology Transfer Office  
Simply put, the establishment of a technology transfer office (TTO) indicates a willingness by a 
university to partner with industry.  TTOs are administrative offices with a staff consisting of 
lawyers, entrepreneurs, academics, and other professionals familiar with the process of taking an 
original product to commercial market. A TTO has three primary responsibilities.  (1) To solicit 
and evaluate academic research by faculty that may have practical commercial applications. (2) 
Once the potential product has been identified, the TTO assists the university researcher through 
the intricate process of the U.S. federal patent system (understanding the complexities of patent 
law are a major function of TTOs).  (3)  To assist university researchers in linking their patented 
product with a company that believes in its potential for profitability. These three responsibilities 
together serve to shepherd a research prototype from the academic research lab to the 
commercial marketplace (Geiger 2004).   
While the majority of extensive research universities in the United States currently 
maintain a TTO, their establishment has only been a relatively recent phenomenon. Only a 
handful of universities had a TTO less than a quarter century ago.  Instead, most universities 
relied upon their research compliance offices to oversee the scant number of patent applications 
(Geiger 2004: 217). In 1980, the U.S. Senate passed the Bayh–Dole Act, which provided 
universities with more expansive rights over the research they conducted using federal funds. 
This federal legislation was designed to rectify the perceived decline of American 
competitiveness in the global market through improved working-relations between institutions of 
higher education and private industry (Bok 2003: 140–141).  For many university administrators, 
this legislation was seen as an opportunity to increase institutional revenue by partnering with 
private firms and profiting from academic research. Within ten years of the passage of the Bayh–
Dole Act, 59 universities (both public and private combined) established TTOs, with another 53 
through the 1990s (Geiger 2004: 217).   
It is important to note that the adoption of TTOs is primarily under the decision–making 
control of university administrators, and not necessarily determined by state politicians or 
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business leaders (Carlsson and Fridh 2002: 205).  Although some states did later enact policies to 
support the mission of TTOs, these government policies were enacted after or concurrently with 
the creation of TTOs. For example the Ben Franklin Partnership Program was established by the 
state of Pennsylvania to help spur economic growth through the public funding of 
technologically innovative firms.  However the locations of the Franklin Centers were 
strategically placed near or on the campuses of research universities within Pennsylvania with 
the intention of bridging the gap between academic research and industry (Geiger 2004: 193). 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a public research university 
has established a technology transfer office in a given year, 0 otherwise. The data comes from 
the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) (2003) licensing survey. This 
survey specifically asks each member to identify the year in which at least .5 of a full-time 
employee was assigned to support technology transfer activities.  It should be noted that not all 
of the universities within the sample are members of AUTM, and therefore did not participate in 
the survey.  However a questionnaire was sent to the non–members in order to confirm that their 
lack of membership to AUTM was due to the non–existence of a TTO within their university.  
This assumption was confirmed based on the responses to the questionnaire.   
Table 4.2 presents descriptive summary statistical information concerning the hazard rate 
underlying the establishment of TTOs by public research universities. 93 institutions out of the 
151 in the sample established a TTO during the full sample period (1978-2003).10  The symmetry 
of the historical evolution of adoption patterns is striking. Specifically, almost half of these 
adoptions occur in the first 13 years of the sample period (1978–1990), while the remaining 
occurs in the latter 13 years (1991–2003). Naturally, the rate of adoptions declines as the end of 
the sample period is reached. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The total number of PRUs who created a TTO by 2003 was 101.  Although eight of the PRUs established their 
TTOs prior to 1978 (the beginning of the study was determined by data availability considerations), these 
institutions are not included in the hazard rate reported in Table 1 since I do not have sufficient data to predict these 
particular cases of TTO creation.  Yet, I do incorporate this information in both the regional and peer diffusion 
independent variables that account for the proportion of previous TTO adoptions. 
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Table 4.1: Hazard rate for adoption of technology transfer office 
 
YEAR RISK SET ADOPTIONS HAZARD RATE 
1978 151 0 0.000 
1979 151 5 0.033 
1980 146 2 0.014 
1981 144 2 0.014 
1982 142 1 0.007 
1983 141 4 0.028 
1984 137 3 0.022 
1985 134 4 0.030 
1986 130 2 0.015 
1987 128 7 0.055 
1988 121 5 0.041 
1989 116 4 0.034 
1990 112 7 0.063 
1991 105 4 0.038 
1992 101 6 0.059 
1993 95 3 0.032 
1994 92 6 0.065 
1995 86 9 0.105 
1996 77 5 0.065 
1997 72 2 0.028 
1998 70 2 0.029 
1999 68 1 0.015 
2000 67 5 0.075 
2001 62 2 0.032 
2002 60 2 0.033 
2003 58 0 0.000 
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4.1.4 DV #2: Engaging in a Private Fundraising Campaign  
In regards to private fundraising, the cost of maintaining a public university has been 
increasingly subsidized by the pockets of wealthy friends and graduates. In general alumni have 
increased their giving by over 20% from 1998-2003, which has translated into universities 
raising over $20 billion dollars per year (Chronicle of Higher Education, 2004).  All types of 
universities, regardless of status or classification, have seen their fund raising enterprise increase 
over the last half decade as in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.2: Total Voluntary Support (Source: Chronicle of Higher Education) 
 
This prioritization of private fundraising can be observed through the change in the role 
and responsibilities of the university president. In a recent study conducted by the American 
Council on Education (2006), over 2,000 college presidents of public and private institutions 
were asked how their time was primarily used.  The most common answer was fundraising, 
where nearly 40% of the presidents placed it among the top three of their responsibilities.  This 
far outnumbered other presidential tasks such as building governing-board relations, overseeing 
personnel issues, or conducting strategic planning. 
A president’s success in fundraising and the priority of the activity has also had a 
significant affect on the rise of presidential salaries. Currently 112 schools compensate their 
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presidents with a package valued at more than a half-million dollars (Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 2006).  These generous salaries are not necessarily due to only outstanding academic 
achievement or research, but also on the president’s ability to raise money.  "There's not 
necessarily a direct correlation between the reputation of the institutions and what the president 
gets, there are a lot of factors that go into the salaries (including )incentives for meeting fund-
raising goals” (Semas 2006).  Today’s university presidents, states Kirp (2003, p. 263), are 
consumed with what he calls “the Sisyphean burdens of fund-raising and the placating of 
multiple constituencies.” In many ways their central function has become raising money and they 
are judged on their ability to accomplish this task. 
To capture the increased importance of private fundraising, a simple dummy variable has 
been created to represent whether a university engaged in a comprehensive public capital 
campaign from 1984-2004 (1 equals that they have initiated a campaign; 0 if they have not).11  
The amount of the campaign is not of importance, but it should be noted that over 60% of them 
have engaged in a fundraising campaign of $100 million dollars or more over the last ten years.  
The information was derived from a number of sources including the Chronicle of Higher 
Education, Chronicle of Philanthropy, and the fundraising consulting firm of Grezenbach, Glier, 
and Associates.  Relying on multiple sources raises some concern for the overall results of this 
specific model, but the accuracy of the information has been confirmed by independent 
research.12
While the ideal construction of the fundraising variable would have been similar to the 
aforementioned “technology transfer” variable, listing the year in which the department was 
established at each institution,  this was not feasible due to the fact that many universities had 
(and continue to have) separate fundraising foundations that are only quasi-affiliated with the 
host school.  An example is the Kansas State Foundation, established in 1944, as a separate 
organization to assist in the fundraising for the university.   The Foundation remains a separate 
entity from the university with its own board of trustees and operating budget. This is 
problematic for the diffusion study since this research is attempting to tap into the factors that 
have altered the decision-making within each university.  It can not examine a policy that has 
                                                 
11 A number of universities engaged in multiple capital campaigns during the period of examination (1984-2004).  
However for the EHA model, only the first one was counted. 
12 The start date (1984) was chosen solely due to limitations in collecting data prior to that time.  
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been adopted by a separate institution. Therefore the “engagement in a comprehensive public 
capital campaign” variable is used since regardless of the institution undertaking the task, the 
decision must meet with the approval of the senior administrators of each university within my 
sample. 
Table 4.4 presents descriptive summary statistical information concerning the hazard rate 
underlying the establishment of a capital campaign by public research universities.   Similar to 
the findings of the technology transfer variable, the decision to launch a capital campaign has 
been relatively “symmetrical” with 56 institutions having initiated a capital campaign prior to 
1994, while 53 did so after.  
 
Table 4.2: Hazard rate for initiating a comprehensice capital campaign 
 
YEAR RISK SET ADOPTIONS HAZARD RATE 
1984 151 0 0.000 
1985 151 2 0.013 
1986 149 6 0.040 
1987 143 7 0.049 
1988 136 7 0.051 
1989 129 5 0.039 
1990 124 10 0.081 
1991 114 4 0.035 
1992 110 6 0.055 
1993 104 9 0.087 
1994 95 6 0.063 
1995 89 8 0.090 
1996 81 6 0.074 
1997 75 11 0.147 
1998 64 7 0.109 
1999 57 4 0.070 
2000 53 3 0.057 
2001 50 6 0.120 
2002 44 2 0.045 
2003 42 1 0.024 
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4.1.5 DV #3: Tuition 
There has been a meteoric rise in the price of tuition and a subsequent transfer of cost to 
students.  In 1964-65 the average tuition price to attend a public 4-year institution was $243 
($1480.73 in current dollars), and over the next 20 years it only rose to $971 ($1765.37 in current 
dollars).  Yet during the academic year of 2004-05, the cost for all public 4-year institutions 
increased to an average of $3,638 – more than double the amount charged in 1984 in current 
dollars (NCES 2004).  To compound the issue, the percentage of total financial assistance in the 
form of loans (as compared to grants) from both state and federal sources has dramatically 
increased over the last ten years.  In 1992-93, 38% of the average financial aid package for a 4-
year public institution consisted of loans that were to be paid back by the student.  However by 
2003-04, the same financial aid package had nearly 47% of its support in the form of loans 
(ibid).  In terms of dollars this difference translated into a student graduating with a debt of 
nearly $4,200 in 1992 as compared to over $5,800 in 2003.  This extensive increase did not 
dissipate when factoring in family income.  A student from a family classified as middle class 
still saw an increase in their loans over the past decade from 37% to over 44% (ibid). 
According to education scholars this rise in tuition and drop in grant money has translated 
into a widening disparity between college attendances for white students versus racial minorities.  
In the last 20 years, white enrollment in higher education among the 25-29 year old population 
has risen from 47% to over 64%, an increase of nearly 27%.  Yet during the same time period 
and among the same age group, the enrollment among black males has gone from 36% to 42%, 
an increase of only 14% (NCES 2004).  Based on these statistics, and many others of a similar 
vein, education experts have drawn the conclusion that higher education, especially at the most 
elite institutions, has become inaccessible for the vast majority of students and families.  The 
cost has simply become too much of an obstacle for the average family to afford.  This runs 
counter to the accepted expectation that post secondary education should be attainable regardless 
of economic background, particularly within the public higher education system.  
This grand expectation, like the financial relationship between state government and 
universities, is based primarily on historical legislation like the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act 
of 1944 (better known as the GI Bill) and the Higher Education Act of 1965. Both of these pieces 
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of legislation were created with the egalitarian objective of increasing accessibility to a wider 
spectrum of the American population through the financial assistance of state and federal 
government.  In both cases they succeeded in their mission and consequently helped shape and 
define public higher education in America (Heller 2001).  Yet now with the rise in tuition and the 
reduction in aid the direct cost has been transferred to the individual student, and the egalitarian 
goal of accessibility has been accused of being forfeited, which leads to it being associated with 
the privatization movement. 
Capturing the policy shift in relation to tuition is a difficult task since it can not be easily 
constructed as a dichotomous variable.  It is unlike the previous two dependent variables where a 
single decision establishes a technology transfer office or launches a multi-million dollar 
campaign.  Rather the increase in tuition prices is a gradual process that is more appropriate to be 
measured as a continuous variable.  To use the event history model technique, the dependent 
variable must be bifurcated (Berry and Berry, 1990).  Therefore the tuition variable has been 
constructed in the following manner:  1=two successive years that a university increased their 
tuition rate by more than 10%; 0=a university has not increased their tuition by more than 10% in 
successive years.13  An example is the University of Michigan which is marked with a ‘1’ in the 
year of 1988, meaning that it increased its tuition rate by double digits in both 1987 and 1988.  
While this is not an ideal construction of the dependent variable and may affect the results, it 
nonetheless reflects a significant plunge by a university into the tuition competition and its 
admittance into the privatization movement. The data comes from the National Center of 
Educational Statistics. 
Table 4.5 presents descriptive summary statistical information concerning the hazard rate 
underlying the rise in tuition rate by public research universities.   Compared to the previous two 
policies (technology transfer and private fundraising), there is no symmetry to the adoption of 
the tuition policy.  Prior to 1994, 67 out of the 87 universities increased their tuition rate (by 
more than 10% in consecutive years).  This predominance in the early period of the analysis 
raises questions about exogenous factors playing a major role in the eventual innovation. 
 
                                                 
13 Some schools increased their tuition by more than 10% (in consecutive years) multiple times during the 
examination period.  For the EHA model, only the first time was counted. 
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Table 4.3 Hazard rate for rising tuition rates 
 
YEAR RISK SET ADOPTIONS HAZARD RATE 
1984 151 0 0.000 
1985 151 0 0.000 
1986 151 11 0.073 
1987 140 9 0.064 
1988 131 16 0.122 
1989 115 4 0.035 
1990 111 4 0.036 
1991 107 7 0.065 
1992 100 12 0.120 
1993 88 4 0.045 
1994 84 2 0.024 
1995 82 3 0.037 
1996 79 2 0.025 
1997 77 1 0.013 
1998 76 4 0.053 
1999 72 2 0.028 
2000 70 1 0.014 
2001 69 0 0.000 
2002 69 5 0.072 
2003 64 0 0.000 
 
 
In sum, a seismic shift has occurred on many college campuses over the past 20-25 years.  
A competition for revenue has forced university administrators to enact policies that shift the 
financial burden to its students, alumni, and corporations.  The reasons for this competition are 
many, but according to critics continual cuts in state allocations and the effects of the 
marketplace are clearly major influences.  It should also be noted that these dependent variables 
share two common fundamental characteristics with existing political science research analyzing 
the diffusion of policy innovations. First, they reflect a deviation from the embedded norm.   
Similar to policy innovations cited in the first chapter, such as children’s health insurance 
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(Volden 2006), abortion restrictions (Mooney and Lee 1995), and welfare policies (Peterson and 
Rom 1989), these three variables depart from past institutional decisions. For example, the 
emphasis by technology transfer offices on profitability represents a significant departure from 
the traditional goals of the academy centered on non–commercial activities. So much so that is 
has caused considerable debate by faculty who view this development as potentially causing 
conflict of interests, reshaping missions, and being detrimental to the overall agenda of public 
higher education (Geiger 2004). Second, university administrators must ex ante weigh the costs 
and benefits of establishing a TTO analogous to what state politicians encounter, for example, 
when attempting to gauge the consequences of lottery, tax change, or casino adoptions (Berry 
and Berry 1990, 1992; Boehmke and Witmer 2004).  In the case of technology transfer policy, 
balancing the tension between standard teaching and research functions within the university to 
service to a broader community is crucial (Carlsson and Fridh 2002: 230).  Thus, the logic of 
TTO adoption by a PRU is rather similar to how state governments weigh either a revenue or 
social welfare enhancing policy innovation that is not costless. 
The following section presents the universities used in the sample.  This is followed by a 
description of the corresponding independent variables constructed for this dissertation, clustered 
into three categories: diffusion, institutional, and state level variables. 
4.2 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
Selecting the appropriate unit of analysis for this study is critical.  Naturally public universities 
should be the focus of the study since they are the institutions under question, but which of the 
state universities are the most logical to examine? I have chosen to focus strictly on public 
institutions classified by the Carnegie Foundation as either “extensive” or “intensive” doctoral 
research universities. The classifications are primarily based on three criteria - the amount of 
appropriations received by the federal government, the size of the graduate programs in terms of 
the number of doctoral degrees awarded, and priority to basic research.14  The justification 
                                                 
14 The exact definition of an Extensive Doctoral/Research University is that “these institutions offer a full range of 
baccalaureate programs, are committed to graduate education through the doctorate degree, and give high priority to 
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behind restricting the sample to only universities under these two classifications is due to one 
primary reason.  The fundamental question behind peer diffusion is whether universities learn 
according to those who hold the same level of prestige throughout the country or conversely by 
their geographical neighbors as proven in past diffusion studies?   The only way to properly 
answer this question is by testing universities that are known beyond their provincial territories.  
A policy can only be potentially learned by a national audience if the school where it is 
implemented is also known at the national level. Logically, a peer network can not be created if 
the members are not aware of each other’s existence (Mintrom and Vergari, 1998).  The schools 
which posses a more “national” reputation tend to be the institutions that receive the most federal 
funding, have the largest graduate programs, and who undertake the most promising research - in 
other words, the universities who are categorized as either extensive or intensive.    With that 
being said, the total number of universities in the sample is 143 (see Appendix).15
4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: DIFFUSION 
4.3.1 Peer Diffusion 
As discussed in chapter 3, institutions like universities have a strong incentive to maintain their 
reputation by emulating those innovations adopted by their peer institutions. DiMaggio and 
Powell note this phenomenon when they state that “Organizational fields that include a large 
professionally trained labor force will be driven primarily by status competition. Organizational 
prestige and resources are key elements in attracting professions. This process encourages 
                                                                                                                                                             
research. They award 50 or more doctoral degrees each year. In addition, they receive annually at least $40 million 
or more in federal support” (www.carnegiefoundation.org/Classification).  An Intensive Doctoral Research 
University is “ 
15 There are 18 extensive or intensive universities that are not part of the sample. One is Rutgers University because 
they did not submit their results to the National Center for Education Statistics in an enough years to make the 
results valid. The other seventeen schools are universities that did not register a reputation score in the U.S. News 
annual rankings and thus could not be analyzed for the peer diffusion variable.  The seventeen schools are the 
following:  Alabama A&M, South Alabama, Arkansas-Little Rock, Louisiana-Lafayette, Maryland-Baltimore, 
Massachusetts-Boston, Central Michigan, Oakland, Jackson State, Nevada-Las Vegas, New Mexico Institute of 
Technology, East Carolina, South Carolina State, South Dakota State, East Tennessee, Texas A&M-Kingsville, and 
Texas-El Paso. 
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homogenization as organizations seek to ensure that they can provide the same benefits and 
services as their competitors (154).” Peer groups can thus provide a novel theoretical 
understanding as to how policy or institutional innovations diffuse within governmental settings. 
The assertion is that institutions, like universities, prefer to emulate those counterparts that are 
comparable to them in terms of status and prestige because of the competition for similar 
resources and employees.  Hence this places considerable pressure on university administrators 
to adopt innovations already undertaken by other institutions of similar caliber.  
In regards to constructing the peer diffusion variable, it is acknowledged that the 
definition of a “peer” can vary depending on the perspective of the individual within the 
institution.  For example in universities a faculty member’s perspective of their peers may only 
be based on their specific field of study, while a senior university administrator may consider 
their peer group based on a broader perspective of the entire university.  These differences 
expose the reality that the term, peer, is vague and flexible depending on its usage. 
With that being said, for this dissertation the peer diffusion variable is based on the 
perspective of the university administration since it is constructed by utilizing the U.S. News and 
World Report’s Annual “America’s Best Colleges” edition (1992–2003).  Since 1992, U.S. News 
has published a college ranking based on a number of criteria including reputation score, which 
is a subjective question related to perceived prestige as viewed by university administrators. 
These rankings are very influential to university administrators strategic planning process insofar 
that it affects the external perception of their institution (Ehrenberg 2002: 149). I ranked my 
sample of universities based on the average annual reputation score received by each institution 
for the period of 1992–2003.  Based on this average annual reputation score, each university was 
placed in a “peer group” with the ten universities ranked immediately higher and lower than 
itself in a given year (see appendix).   
A skeptic might have two concerns with this construct.  The first concern being that I am 
extrapolating the average annual reputation score to the years prior to 1992.  In other words, for 
years prior to the availability of this ranking, I utilize the average reputation score culled from 
the 1992–2003 rankings to determine peer institutions for this earlier period when the data did 
not exist.  However it should be noted that none of the public research universities in the sample 
had an average deviation of more than ten positions during the 1992—2003 annual period. This 
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suggests that these reputation scores are highly stable through time and that the measure will be 
robust to random, idiosyncratic fluctuations in the rankings.  
The second concern a skeptic might claim is that a large overlap exists for institutions 
appearing in both diffusion variables since those that are geographically proximate (regional 
diffusion) tend to be comparable to in terms of status (peer diffusion). For example, many of the 
Big-10 universities are viewed equally in regards to reputation and they are located within 
neighboring states. However this conjecture is not supported by the data.  Specifically, the 
correlation coefficient between the regional diffusion and peer diffusion variables is moderate 
(0.436).  The peer diffusion variable is thus coded as the proportion of public research 
universities, which were either ten positions higher or ten positions lower than universityi  that 
had previously adopted the policy in question (i.e. establish a  TTO, launch a capital campaign, 
or substantially increase tuition rates) prior to year t.13  
In the end I expect that peer diffusion will have a significant effect on policy adoption.  If 
a peer has implemented a privatization policy, this will in turn, positively increase the possibility 
for adoption by the other universities within the same peer group 
4.3.2 Regional Diffusion Variable 
The regional diffusion variable is calculated in two steps. First it follows the standard calculation 
done in previous diffusion studies, where the regional diffusion variable is measured as the 
proportion of public research universities in the contiguous states to universityi who have 
adopted the policy in question prior to year t.16  In addition the in-state brethren of univesityi are 
also included in the calculation since they constitute part of the regional diffusion effect on 
institutional innovation.  For example it is assumed that University of Pittsburgh would be as 
influenced by the decisions made by administrators at Penn State (in-state neighbor) as they 
would by those at Ohio State (contiguous neighbor).17  This has not been considered by past 
diffusion studies because the analysis has been conducted at the state level (i.e. state 
                                                 
16 The reasoning for including proportion–based diffusion measures here is to mitigate any concerns about potential 
spurious results arising from variations involving geographic density across regions. 
17 A test was run controlling for in-state influence and the results did not alter the significance of the eventual 
findings. 
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legislatures), where there is no comparable in-state institutional neighbor. The inclusion of in–
state institutions with out–of–state institutions should not have any bearing on the subsequent 
statistical analysis. The correlation between the augmented regional diffusion measure 
containing both in–state and out–of–state previous adoptions and a standard variable that only 
accounts for out–of–state previous adoptions is 0.969.   Hence the regional diffusion variable is 
the proportion of public research universities within the region (both in–state and out–of–state) 
who adopted the policy in a prior year. 
  
4.4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: INSTITUTIONAL  
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, the factors tested in this study can be divided into 
three categories - institutional, state, and diffusion.  In regards to the institutional variables, they 
are the determinants that tap into the variation of norms and arrangements within America’s 
public universities.  The United States enjoys a wide diversity of higher education institutions, 
particularly as it relates to size, wealth, governance structure, and mission.   It is this diversity 
that makes it an ideal institution to investigate when attempting to uncover the importance of 
institutional-level features and arrangements on policy outputs.  As Robert Lowry notes, one of 
the good reasons to analyze public universities is because “(they are) engaged in similar 
activities and the variation in institutional arrangements for governing public universities provide 
rich context that allows us to compare the effects of different instruments and combinations of 
instruments for political control” (2001, 846). This logic underlies the importance for including 
university variables when attempting to uncover why some schools privatize to a greater degree 
than others.  The institutional-level variables that are tested are the following: 
4.4.1 Governance Structure  
Besides the theoretical logic discussed in Chapter 2, understanding the institutional structure and 
arrangements of a university is critical because of past studies, primarily in the field of 
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education, that have found it to be significant in determining the likelihood of certain policy 
adoption (Hearn and Griswold, 1994, Lowry, 2001, Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2003, and 
McLendon, Heller, and Young, 2005).  For this research variables that tap into both the 
governance arrangements with the board of trustees and the state government are included.  
University administrators typically have to deal with two levels of oversight, one coming from 
the institutional level board and the other coming from the state legislature.  Since these are 
never two completely separate entities, including variables that capture both of their influence on 
the decision making process within universities is crucial. To this end, I have constructed four 
separate exogenous variables – two directly related to the arrangements of the board of trustees, 
and two related to the political oversight by state government. 
The first variable captures the level of bureaucratic inertia that each university 
experiences due to the total number of years in a term that the majority of trustees serve on their 
board of trustees. The expectation is that trustee boards whose members possess lengthy terms 
will induce stagnation since new ideas that arise from board member turnover will be slow and 
gradual. The second variable is operationalized as the total number of board trustees with voting 
privileges.  This can cause coordination problems and thus the expectation is that larger trustee 
boards will make it more difficult for the university leadership to facilitate major institutional 
change in a bold manner, which defines the privatization policies being examined. The third 
variable is the level of planning and budgetary restrictions placed on universities by state 
government (McGuiness 2006).  The level of planning and budgetary restrictions is computed as 
an ordinal scale where universities with a low score (1 or 2 on the ordinal scale) are overseen by 
a governance system that simply holds advisory capabilities in regards to planning and budgetary 
decisions.   In these cases the state board or agency has the authority to review budgets and 
operations, but can only offer recommendations to the universities within the system.   While 
universities with a high score (3, 4, or 5 on the ordinal scale) are controlled by a strong state 
governance system that possesses authority over budgetary and/or programmatic affairs. In these 
cases, universities must have their budgets and/or programmatic plans approved by the state 
board before they can be implemented.  The last governance structure variable is measured as the 
proportion of board trustees appointed by the state governor, the state legislator, or serving in an 
ex officio capacity. The assumption is that while some politicians may want universities to 
become more self-sufficient (and thus support the enactment of the privatization policies), the 
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added layer of government bureaucracy will nullify this possibility and simply make it more 
difficult for university administrators to enact the policies in question.  The data source for these 
four variables comes from both the State Postsecondary Education Structures Handbook 
(McGuinness 1985–2004) and by–laws from each public research university analyzed in the 
sample.  
4.4.2 Medical School  
Every year the National Institute of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
generate a ranking of the universities that receive the largest appropriations from their respected 
departments.   The list of institutions rarely changes with the same schools routinely receiving 
the largest share of the federal grants.  This raised the question of why there is such minimal 
variation in these annual rankings.  In their analysis on the development and productivity of 
American research universities since World War II, Graham and Diamond (1997) were able to 
reveal that after controlling for size of the institutions, the critical variable that helps determine 
the level of federal appropriations for a university is the affiliation with a medical school.  The 
existence of a medical school (particularly a highly rated one) has a tremendous impact in the 
amount of annual funding a university receives from the most prominent federal government 
sources such as the NIH and NSF.  This important relationship can be primarily attributed to the 
fact that during the postwar era much of the promising research has been identified in the broader 
medical field. 
 This competitive advantage held by universities with medical schools could 
potentially play a factor as it relates to the adoption of the privatization policies since it is a 
major revenue stream that could affect whether other revenue producing policies are needed to 
be implemented.   It could be argued that institutions with medical schools will be less likely to 
adopt a policy of higher tuition since they are not as desperate for added revenue due to the 
infusion of federal dollars.  However the increased federal appropriations would spawn a need to 
establish a technology transfer office to take advantage of the research being conducted and the 
profits that it could generate.  Additionally, a medical school is attractive to private donors for 
many of the same reasons it is attractive to government officials – promising research applicable 
to current issues.  The variable is constructed as a simple binary dummy variable with 1 
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representing the existence of a medical school and 0 representing the non-existence of one.  The 
data comes from the National Center of Educational Statistics. 
4.4.3 Land Grant 
As noted earlier, the Morrill Act of 1862 formally enacted the fiscal relationship between 
government and higher education, assigning both federal and state government the responsibility 
of being proper financial stewards.   The Morrill Act’s other significant implication was that it 
provided a clear mission to those universities established due to the legislation “to teach such 
branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts“(Heller, 2001, 134).  
More broadly, these universities (commonly known as “land grant” institutions) were seen as 
focal points for applied research benefiting local communities and the larger American society.   
The question currently is whether this mission is still relevant on many of these land grant 
campuses? 
The assumption is that being a land grant school has very little relevance to the everyday 
decisions being made by administrators at these respected institutions.  I doubt that the Morrill 
Act of 1862 heavily influences whether a policy of higher tuition is implemented or a large 
capital campaign is launched.  These are decisions made based on current environments and 
attempting to address current financial issues. However I do suspect that the Morrill Act’s early 
emphasis on research would place land grant schools in a better position to establish a TTO and 
the needed departments to make it successful.  The variable is a dummy variable with 1 being a 
land grant institution versus 0 representing a non-land grant university. 
4.4.4 Wealth 
Naturally a university’s wealth must be controlled for in this study. The logical data to utilize for 
this purpose is the size of each university’s endowment.  Unfortunately this is not as easy to 
obtain as one might think.  The primary obstacle is that not all endowments are overseen by each 
individual institution. In some cases the entire university system controls the endowment and 
thus the value is based on the wealth of all of the institutions within the system. An ideal 
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example is the State University System of New York (SUNY).  Accessing the total value of the 
endowment for the SUNY system is relatively easy, but it is nearly impossible to calculate how 
much of the value is directly associated with SUNY-Buffalo or SUNY-Stony Brook (and both 
institutions are in the sample).    Thus an alternative measure is utilized to control for wealth, 
whether the institution is classified as either an “extensive” or “intensive” university by the 
Carnegie Foundation. As noted, the sample drew from only public research universities 
classified as either extensive or intensive, the distinction based primarily on the number of 
doctorates awarded annually and the amount of money received by the federal government.  The 
expectation is that extensive universities will be more likely to establish a TTO and initiate a 
campaign since they have greater economic pressures to remain competitive in the intense field 
of research.   
  
4.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: STATE  
In regards to the state variables, I applied the three standard diffusion variables used in past 
studies – state wealth, state partisanship and legislative professionalism.  State wealth is 
measured as the average real state personal income (in 2000 constant dollars), and its data source 
is the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis: State and Local Personal Income 1978–2003.  The 
assumption is that the aggregate state wealth will be positively related to the probability of public 
research universities adopting an innovation.  Legislative Professionalism is measured as the 
estimated annual inflation–adjusted salary of a state legislator within each state (these data come 
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census: Legislative Compensation – Regular Sessions: 1978–2004). 
The expectation is that with a higher level of state legislative professionalism will result in a 
greater likelihood of adoption due to the fact that universities located in states with high levels of 
legislative professionalism will have legislators interested in seeing that these public institutions 
maintain pace with both regional and peer competitors.  The state partisanship variable is 
constructed by coding +1 in each year a state is controlled by Republicans in both the 
governorship and state houses (lower and upper); +0.5 when a Republican occupies the 
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governorship, but there is divided government within the upper and lower state houses; 0 when 
there is pure divided government between the governorship and the state houses; -.05 when a 
Democrat holds the governorship while the house is divided; and -1 when the Democrats control 
both the governorship and state houses.  The assumption is that states controlled by Republicans 
will be more likely to support the privatization policies since they encourage universities to 
become more self-sufficient and less reliant on state appropriations. 
 In addition the variable state appropriations were added to the model due to its critical 
importance to the current debate about the privatization movement. The assumption is that a 
decline in state appropriations will increase the probability of adopting all three privatization 
policies. 
Lastly a linear trend variable is added which controls for any duration dependence that 
the model specification fails to capture. The logic underlying this linear trend variable is that 
with each additional passing year, the likelihood that a university implements a policy will 
increase. 
4.6 METHODOLOGY  
The methodology utilized for this dissertation will be a logistic regression variant of the event 
history analysis technique discussed in Chapter 2 (Berry and Berry, 1990).  The main advantage 
to the event history analysis is that it captures the issues of time and units, both of which are 
critical to this study. By constructing a time series dataset and applying it to this pooled time-
series cross-sectional (TSCS) method it will take into consideration the affect of time on each 
unit of analysis.  Since this dissertation will be observing the behavior (or more specifically, the 
decision making process) of universities over an extended period of time, it is therefore vital to 
employ a technique that combines both components and generates a separate unit for each 
university by year.   
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Table 4.4: Summary of Hypothesis 
 
 
Technology 
Transfer Office 
Capital 
Campaign 
Tuition 
Diffusion Variables    
Peer Diffusion ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Regional Diffusion No correlation No correlation No correlation 
Institutional Variables    
Length of Tenure for Trustees ↓ ↓ ↓ 
# of University Trustees ↓ ↓ ↓ 
% Politically Appointed Trustees ↑ ↑ ↑ 
State Regulation ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Medical School ↑ ↑ ↓ 
Land Grant ↑ ↑ ↓ 
Extensive ↑ ↑ ↓ 
State Variables    
Legislative Professionalism No correlation No correlation No correlation 
State Income No correlation No correlation No correlation 
State Partisanship ↑ ↑ ↑ 
State Appropriations ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Control Variable    
Log Linear ↑ ↑ ↑ 
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5.0  CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS FROM MODEL #1 - ADOPTION OF 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICE 
The following three chapters will present the results of the individual models constructed to test 
the determinants in adopting the three selected privatization policies discussed in Chapter 4: the 
establishment of a technology transfer office, the increase in tuition rate, and the engagement in a 
comprehensive capital campaign.  In each of these models the primary objective is to reveal the 
influences that alter the behavior of a university administration.  As mentioned throughout this 
dissertation, the overarching assumption is that universities are primarily affected by the 
decisions and actions of their peers.  Pressure to remain competitive with those institutions in 
which one shares a similar level of prestige and status cause university administrators and senior 
leaders to “innovate” by implementing policies that were previously inconceivable, but are now 
accepted by their brethren. In addition, drawing from the assumption that the institutional 
environment matters, it is theorized that institutional norms and structure will also affect the 
potential outcome of each university as to whether they adopt the policy in question.   In sum the 
results presented in the following three chapters adequately address and answer the fundamental 
research question: what are the determinants that motivate a university to innovate and 
adopt a specific institutional policy? 
While the dependent variable differs for each of the three models, the remaining 
components and operationalization are very similar.   Following the past utilization of event 
history analysis in previous diffusion studies, I employ a logistic regression analysis in all three 
models.  I cluster the units of analysis by university to address any potential issue caused by the 
lack of independence in adopting the privatization policy in question.  In addition a probability 
coefficient is produced for each explanatory variable in an effort to capture the chances of the 
adoption occurring for each unit increase. The majority of independent variables utilized in each 
of the models are the same. They are grouped into the categories discussed in Chapter 4 – 
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university, state, and diffusion variables.  In each chapter the statistical results of each variable 
will be discussed and analyzed.  This chapter will specifically present the results related to the 
adoption of a technology transfer office.  It will be followed by the analysis on private fund 
raising in Chapter 6, and tuition in Chapter 7. 
5.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICE 
Table 5.1 displays the results from the first model predicting the adoption of a technology 
transfer office by a public research university between the years of 1978–2003.  The first column 
shows the coefficients of each variable. The second column displays the robust standard errors, 
followed by the probability in column three; all statistically significant coefficients are bolded. 
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Table 5.1: EHA Predicting TTO Adoptions 
 
 Logit Coefficient Standard Errors Probability 
Diffusion Variables    
Peer Diffusion      2.210*** 0.604 0.055 
Regional Diffusion -0.629 0.959 -0.012 
University Variables    
Trustee Tenure Length -0.064 0.056 -0.002 
# of University Trustees -0.015 0.017 -0.000 
%Politically–Appointed Trustees -0.041 0.026 -0.001 
State Regulations    0.165** 0.094 0.005 
Medical School      0.778*** 0.244 0.021 
Land Grant 0.364 0.246 0.010 
Extensive University     1.332*** 0.366 0.029 
State Variables    
Legislative Salary         0.077E-04        0.074E-04        0.025E-05 
State Income  -0.018 0.050 -0.000 
State Partisanship 0.105 0.198 0.002 
State Appropriations 0.354 0.742 0.003 
Control Variables    
Linear Time Trend 0.663 0.341 0.015 
Constant -5.915 1.126 --------- 
Summary Statistics    
Pseudo R2 0.128   
Number of Observations 2302   
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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5.1.1 Diffusion Variables 
As noted above in Table 5.1, the evidence regarding how the policy of technology transfer 
diffuses amongst public research universities is unequivocal.  The peer diffusion variable shows 
to be highly significant, indicating that a university is much more inclined to adopt a technology 
transfer office if their peer has established one in a previous year.18  More specifically based on 
the probability computation, for every one university that establishes a technology transfer office 
there is a 5% increase in the likelihood that the other universities within the peer group will also 
adopt the policy.  In stark contrast, the regional diffusion variable shows no sign of significance 
in affecting the outcome of the policy.  The decisions (of the lack there of) by a university’s 
regional neighbors has minimal affect on its resolution to establish an official technology transfer 
operation for itself.   
These results strongly support my initial questioning of the contiguous theory being 
applied to public universities, particularly as it relates to the operation of technology transfer 
where the competition to discover and market the next “big thing” is at the national (possibly 
even international) level, not regional.  The intense pressure university administrators are under 
to find highly lucrative products within the research conducted on their campus abolishes many 
of the provincial parameters they typically act within.  This is not to say that the contiguous 
theory is obsolete.  On the contrary the numerous diffusion studies that have recently been 
conducted confirm that many states continue to have a very provincial view of policy adoption.  
Instead the results of the model simply strengthen the argument that different public institutions 
have different networks by which they learn about potential policies and innovations.  For state 
agencies it is too expensive politically and economically to engage in a substantive search for 
practical policy solutions, hence they take the easy and less risk adverse road of adopting 
primarily regional policies. Yet university administrators, who under similar limitations and 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that in a separate study (Weinstein and Krause, N.d.)  the peer diffusion variable was 
split into two peer groups – the institutions above the university in question and the institutions below the university 
in question.  Understandably it could be theorized that universities would be more likely to copy the policies 
implemented by the universities in their “aspiration” group as compared to those trialing them in the rankings. 
However the results showed that there was no statistically significant difference between the two separate 
constructions of the peer variable and the single construction utilized for this dissertation.  
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concerns are able to venture beyond their region due to the significant reduction in transaction 
costs caused by the utilization of rankings as a heuristic.  This would seem to be particularly true 
in regards to the establishment of a technology transfer office since one of its primary objectives 
is to increase revenue for the university, a statistic that has substantial influence in determining 
rankings and elevating status. 
5.1.2 University Variables   
Similar to the results of the diffusion variables, the university level variables revealed 
directionality and significance according to their hypotheses stated in Chapter 4. Specifically, the 
university variables that attempted to capture the level of state government supervision validated 
the expectations.  It was predicted that additional government oversight would reduce the 
probability of adopting the privatization policy of technology transfer due to inertia caused by 
added governmental bureaucracy.  Specifically the ordinal scale of state planning and budgetary 
regulations showed that as a state government moved up the scale (becoming less stringent in 
their oversight) the probability of a university adopting the innovation of technology transfer 
increased by over 16%.   This was also proved to be true in regards to trustee involvement where 
both the number of overall trustees serving on a board and the length of their term negatively 
affected the chances for innovation.  While the figure did not result in a statistically significant 
determinant, the appropriate directionality did confirm that with each added government 
assigned trustee, a university was less likely to implement the policy.   
As it relates to the university variables that attempted to tap into the norms and missions 
of the institutions, their strong results also validated their expected importance.  If a university 
was classified as an extensive institution, it translated into a substantial increase in likelihood 
that it would establish a technology transfer office, which makes logical sense since the 
definition of an extensive university is primarily based on the institution’s commitment to basic 
research.  It would be incongruous for a university whose primary mission is to advance basic 
academic research to not financially support one of the most promising and critical “tools” 
developed for professors over the last 25 years.  Lastly, the possession of a medical school 
greatly affected the probability of a public research university establishing a technology transfer 
office.  According to the results, the addition of a medical school increaes the probability of a 
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university adopting the technology transfer policy by over 77%. The underlying assumption is 
that a medical school provides additional research opportunities, many of them with significant 
financial promise, thus motivating universities who posses a medical school to take advantage of 
the current commercial interest in bio-medical research by establishing a technology transfer 
office and quickly producing marketable (and hopefully profitable) research. 
 
5.1.3 State Variables 
The last set of variables, state variables, were included in the model due to their substantial 
importance in past diffusion studies.   As noted in Chapter 2, numerous research has found the 
level of professionalism of each state legislature (represented by the annual salary earned by the 
state legislators), the wealth of the state citizenry, and the partisanship within state government to 
hold significant influence in determining which policies ultimately get passed and which get 
nullified.  However the results of the model do not reach the same conclusion.  In all cases the 
variables did not reach significant levels in determining the chances of a university innovating 
from the establishment of a technology transfer office, confirming the expectations presented 
earlier. This is not too surprising since all of the policies being tested for this dissertation, but 
particularly the establishment of a technology transfer office, are primarily institutional policies 
that are generated and implemented by internal university administrators as compared to state 
policy-makers.   As noted earlier in the dissertation, a proper policy diffusion study must 
examine policies that are within the control of the institution being studied so as not to be tainted 
by exogenous factors not taken into consideration by the models.  This is not to say that state 
legislators can not have a meaningful impact on the likelihood that a higher education policy will 
be adopted, but as compared to the effect university administrators can have, it pales in 
comparison. 
5.1.4 Control Variables 
 In addition to the variables grouped into the clusters mentioned above, I included one additional 
control variable critical to diffusion studies and technology transfer in particular.  The variable is 
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simply a log linear trend that tests the impact of time, or more specifically each passing year that 
a university does not innovate. Logically this variable does prove to be important, validating the 
assumption that as time elapses, there is increased pressure for a university to establish a 
technology transfer office.  
 63 
6.0  CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS FROM MODEL #2 - CAPITAL CAMPAIGN 
This chapter focuses on the motivations behind the launching of a comprehensive capital 
campaign by a public research university.  A similar format to the previous chapter is followed.   
I first present the statistical results of the logit regression, followed by an interpretation of the 
data, and then ending with a final summary of the key findings.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
overall objective of this empirical model is to ascertain the reasons for a university to engage in a 
policy that is as expansive and costly as a capital campaign.  It is not a simple decision to launch 
a campaign, it involves a significant amount of resources, the least of which a substantial portion 
of time on the part of a university President and other senior administrators.  Who are the 
universities that are placing this pressure to act – those from contiguous states or those 
institutions whom hold a similar position in the annual rankings?  And how much of a factor 
does the mission and governance structure of each school matter in determining the likelihood of 
engaging in this endeavor?  This chapter helps answer these important questions as it relates to 
the monumental decision of initiating a capital campaign. 
6.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 6.1 displays the results from the second model predicting the initiation of a comprehensive 
campaign by a public research university between the years of 1984–2003.  The first column 
shows the coefficients of each variable; the second column displays the robust standard errors; 
followed by the probability measure in column three.  All statistically significant coefficients are 
bolded. 
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Table 6.1: EHA Predicting Capital Campaign Adoption 
 
 Logit Coefficient Standard Errors Probability 
Diffusion Variables    
Peer Diffusion       2.142*** 0.607 0.089 
Regional Diffusion -0.244 1.064 -0.005 
University Variables    
Trustee Tenure Length -0.014 0.068 -0.004 
# of University Trustees -0.014 0.022 -0.001 
%Politically–Appointed Trustees -0.154 0.569 -0.007 
State Regulation 0.250 0.188 0.010 
Medical School   0.434* 0.252 0.021 
Land Grant  0.248 0.239 0.009 
Extensive University     0.850** 0.307 0.033 
State Variables    
Legislative Salary         0.035E-04      0.01E-04         0.012E-05 
State Income   -0.069 0.047 -0.002 
State Partisanship -0.026 0.173 -0.001 
State Appropriations -0.175 0.647 -0.002 
Statistical Controls    
Linear Time Trend 0.349 0.282 0.013 
Constant -3.074 1.340 -------- 
Summary Statistics    
Pseudo R2 .082   
Number of Observations 1791   
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
. 
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6.1.1 Diffusion Variables 
Similar to the results in the first model (see Chapter 5), a school’s decision to launch a 
comprehensive campaign is highly influenced by the past actions of the universities who hold a 
similar place in the U.S. News and World Report annual rankings.  If an institution has 
previously decided to engage in a campaign, the chances the others within their peer group will 
soon follow suit increases by almost 9%.  In other words, when the University of Michigan 
(ranked #2) decides to launch a multi-million dollar campaign, it sends a clear message to its 
competitors of its strategy which dramatically increases the chances that UC Berkeley (#1), 
Virginia (#3), Wisconsin (#4), UCLA (#5) and the other institutions of similar status will imitate 
Michigan’s actions and launch a campaign soon thereafter.  In fact this is exactly what transpired 
when Michigan announced their campaign in 1983, UCLA soon followed by announcing one in 
1984, UC Berkeley in 1985, Wisconsin in 1988, and Virginia in 1992.  On the other end of the 
prestige spectrum a similar sequence of events occurred.  When University of Rhode Island 
(#68) announced a campaign in 1992, University of Alabama (#69), University of Missouri-
Rolla (#67), Louisiana State University (#66), and University of Cincinnati (#69) quickly 
followed the proclamation and launched individual campaigns all within three years of Rhode 
Island’s initial decision.  These examples in conjunction with the statistical results provides 
strong evidence that peer pressure is highly influential in affecting whether this specific policy 
ultimately gets accepted and implemented by a university.  
In regards to the spread of innovation based on regional pressures, the results show no 
sign of significance.  The lack of magnitude in the resulting coefficients provides strong 
evidence that a university will make decisions independent of the actions conducted by their 
geographical neighbors.   Thus the administrators at the University of Michigan most likely 
decided to launch a campaign regardless of the decisions made by the administrators at Michigan 
State, Ohio State, Purdue, or any other of their regional neighbors.  Instead their attention was 
focused on the actions of their true competition in Berkeley, Madison, and Charlottesville.  This 
finding confirms the hypothesis stated earlier that the contiguous state theory did not make 
strong theoretical sense as it relates to the decision to initiate a capital campaign.  This particular 
innovation is at the core a decision about raising critical funds for recruiting the top professors 
and students, providing the newest facilities, and being the most attractive to large federal 
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appropriations.  All of these goals are evidence that the battle between universities is being 
waged at the national level, not at the regional.   The rankings generated by publications such as 
the U.S. News and World Report simply provide the additional information regarding whom 
specifically each university is competing against in this nation-wide rivalry.     
6.1.2 University Variables 
Two of the university variables proved to be influential in determining the probability of a 
university adopting the policy of a capital campaign. The first is whether the institution in 
question is classified as an extensive university.  An extensive university is three times more 
likely to launch a comprehensive campaign than an intensive institution.  This result follows the 
initial hypothesis discussed in the previous chapter and makes theoretical sense since “extensive” 
universities have placed greater importance and focus on the endeavor of research as compared 
to their “intensive” counterparts.  Research is an expensive enterprise and forces administrators 
and professors to constantly seek revenue streams to support it.  In simple terms extensive 
universities need more money and thus are more likely to adopt a policy that directly addresses 
this issue.  In addition being an extensive university and having research be an institutional 
priority makes the decision to engage in this costly endeavor more justifiable.  University 
administrators can easily convince themselves and other institutional leaders that they are simply 
being loyal to the mission of the institution to support the operation of research.  Following along 
the same line of logic, the other university level variable that proved to be important in 
determining the likelihood of launching a capital campaign was the existence of a medical 
school.  Similar to the analysis discussed earlier, the existence of a medical school plays a major 
role in the mission and type of research being conducted within the university.   A quick perusal 
of the top schools in National Science Foundation funding will reveal a predominance of 
universities with medical schools.    
One surprising null result was the lack of importance of state appropriations received by 
the individual university.  The assumption was that if state appropriations decreased from one 
year to the next, it would motivate universities to engage in a campaign to recoup the lost 
funding.  Yet the results showed that it was a non factor, raising questions about the complaint 
often cited by university leadership that they are being forced into a comprehensive campaign 
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due to the dramatically falling assistance from state government.  However a possible reason for 
this unusual result may be due to a simple principle-agent problem of imperfect communication.  
The message being sent by state government to universities to find and increase their own 
funding may take a longer period of time than the one year change that is being calculated in this 
model.  In other words a longer trend of diminishing appropriations may have been occurring 
prior to the one year increase that supposedly generated the innovation.  A future project should 
investigate more comprehensively the period of time prior to the announcement of a campaign 
before concluding this non-existent correlation. 
6.1.3 State Variables 
Interestingly none of the state variables proved to be significant in determining the probability of 
a university engaging in a comprehensive capital campaign.  Neither the variables that attempted 
to tap into the economic and political disposition of the state citizenry, nor the variable that tried 
to capture the professionalism of the state government proved to be consequential in the final 
decision to launch a campaign. So the question can be raised as to why this surprising result? 
One of the possible explanations for this unexpected outcome is that engaging in a 
campaign is not politically controversial.   As compared to shifting institutional priorities away 
from teaching (which technology transfer has been accused of doing) or raising the cost of 
education, initiating a capital campaign is a relatively modest proposal that would not necessarily 
rile political protest from either the citizenry or government representatives.  This lack 
controversy would help explain why the probability of initiating a capital campaign did not 
change based on the political leanings of the state or the level of professionalism of the state 
legislature.  As a public policy it lacks the gravitas to attract significant government attention, 
and thus is implemented by universities according to their agenda. 
Another possible explanation for the null results is that capital campaigns are such an 
accepted part of the greater higher education landscape that they are not truly an “innovation”.  
They are not a new idea that radically changes the perception and dynamic of the institution and 
thus is not considered an innovation as defined by previous diffusion literature.  Campaigns have 
been a vital tool for private institutions for decades.  Naturally state legislators and citizens are 
familiar with the practice and do need a substantial amount of information to draw an opinion on 
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the matter.  This is quite different than the situation with the establishment of a technology 
transfer office, which can be easily assumed to be an innovation due its short history and unique 
purpose.  Hence the policy of launching a capital campaign overcomes any political pressure or 
government inertia that normally influences the progress of adopting true university innovations.    
6.2 CONCLUSION 
The results of the model were as expected.  The strong influence of peer pressure fits logically 
with the underlying hypothesis that universities want to generate greater revenue and when their 
competition adopts a policy that addresses that desire, they will quickly follow the actions of the 
initial adopter.  This theory also helps explain why only university level variables revealed 
significance as compared to state level determinants.  Engaging in a comprehensive campaign is 
a decision strictly made by university leaders and thus will diffuse according to their perception 
of the competition.  However the lack of robustness in relation to the state variables does raise 
questions about the true innovativeness of campaigns.  It could be argued that if a policy does not 
garner political attention, it is not truly altering the dynamic of the institution, a key component 
to the diffusion of innovation. 
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7.0  CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS FROM MODEL #3 - RAISING TUITION 
This chapter will present the results and subsequent analysis of the diffusion of tuition rates 
amongst public research universities.  It will follow a similar format to the previous chapters, 
documenting the computation of the logit regression followed by an interpretation of the 
statistical results of each explanatory variable.  It should be reiterated that the confidence of these 
expected results are not as high as those in the previous models. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
constructing a dichotomous variable that would adequately capture the recent trend in tuition 
costs proved to be difficult.  It is not as simple and clean as determining the year in which a 
particular office/department is established (i.e. technology transfer), nor when a publicly stated 
goal is issued (i.e. capital campaign).  Instead the process by which a tuition price is determined 
by each university is more opaque; and thus the results of this model may need to be taken with 
some reservation. However the critical importance of tuition to a university’s operation and its 
pertinence to the privatization movement makes it vitally important to analyze for this 
dissertation. 
7.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 7.1 displays the results from the third model predicting the policy adoption of escalating 
tuition rates by a public research university between the years of 1984–2003.  The first column 
shows the coefficients of each variable; the second column displays the robust standard errors; 
the third column is the probability computation.  All statistically significant coefficients are 
bolded. 
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Table 7.1: EHA Predicting Raising Tuition Adoption 
 
 Logit Coefficient Standard Errors Probability 
Diffusion Variables    
Peer Diffusion -2.336 1.143 -0.104 
Regional Diffusion       2.719*** 0.831 0.119 
University Variables    
Trustee Tenure Length -0.107 0.070 -0.004 
# University Trustees -0.025 0.025 -0.001 
% Politically–Appointed Trustees      0.059** 0.030 0.002 
State Regulations -0.118 0.197 -0.005 
Medical School -0.330 0.315 -0.012 
Land Grant  -0.220 0.257 -0.009 
Extensive University -0.307 0.293 -0.017 
State Variables    
Legislative Salary          0.093E-05        0.011E-03         0.023E-06 
State Income   -0.029 0.064 -0.001 
State Partisanship    -0.465** 0.176 -0.021 
State Appropriations -0.018 0.016 -0.001 
Statistical Controls    
Linear Time Trend  0.192 0.456 0.001 
Constant -1.624 1.521 --------- 
Summary Statistics    
Pseudo R2 .063   
Number of Observations 1618   
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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7.1.1 Diffusion Variables 
The results of the diffusion variables, region and peer, were the opposite of their expected 
outcome.  Instead of peer pressure being the primary catalyst for rising tuition rates, it was 
regional pressure that seemed to cause universities to increase their tuition by double digits in 
consecutive years.  The initial assumption was that universities, constantly under pressure to 
increase revenues, would increase tuition prices when given a window of opportunity that would 
not cause significant political or societal backlash.  That “window” would most likely occur 
when other institutions of similar standing were also increasing tuition rates by substantial 
amounts.  In essence universities were only waiting for the historical norm of access and 
egalitarianism to be weakened providing them a new environment upon which to implement 
their privatization policy of escalating tuition.   However based on the results stated in table 7.1, 
peer diffusion did not increase the chances of tuition hikes. In fact the results were not only 
statistically insignificant, but the directionality was negative, raising a future question of whether 
peer pressure actually decreases the probability of a university adopting the tuition policy.   
Yet the affects of regional pressure were strongly robust.  According to the model, a 
university has an 11% greater chance of increasing their tuition for every one additional 
geographical neighbor who has done the same in the past.  While my hypothesis is still viable 
regarding university administrators waiting for norms to shift, it is obvious that regional 
pressure, not peer, is the force that is opening the window of opportunity.   
It should be noted that in Chapter 4, I did have some reservations about tuition being an 
outlier compared to the other dependent variables due to two primary reasons.  First, of all the 
policies being tested in this dissertation, tuition could be the most susceptible to geographical 
pressures due to regional competition for prospective students.  While out-of-state students do 
remain in the minority at almost all public research universities, these minority groups do tend to 
hail from states contiguous with the state of the chosen institution. Thus a competition does exist 
between geographical neighbors to remain as a viable choice among these prospective students.  
The second potential reason why regionalism is so significant is due to the political sensitivity of 
tuition as a public policy.   As compared to technology transfer and capital campaigns, tuition 
prices affect a much broader constituency and thus viewed by many political leaders as a state 
issue.  Politicians are fully aware that fighting for lower tuition rates is an argument that will 
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receive little backlash.  It is a safe policy to support, and as a result will receive a tremendous 
amount of political attention.  This political pressure in turn constrains university administrators 
in implementing their ideal agenda of increasing revenues through the escalation of tuition rates.  
It is only after other states have increased their prices would other state officials capitulate and 
“allow” their universities to follow suit. 
On a related note, the significance of geographical pressure raises an interesting question 
of whether there are certain regions within the country where it is more influential than others.  It 
could be hypothesized that universities which educate a substantial portion of their regional 
population will be less likely to increase tuition due to strong political pressure.  It is only when 
other regional schools begin to increase their tuition rates does the tipping point shift and the 
policy of tuition spreads.  Hence schools in the Midwest, West, and South will find regional 
pressure to be more influential than universities in the Northeast where a larger segment of the 
population is educated by private institutions.  To test this hypothesis a dummy variable was 
created for the four regions; the results of the regression are displayed in Table 7.2. 
 
 
Table 7.2: Geographical Influence on Tuition Increases 
 
Geographical Region Logit Coefficient Robust Standard Errors 
South 0.685** 0.291 
Northeast -0.471 0.486 
Midwest -1.091** 0.382 
West 0.5333* 0.325 
 
 * p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01. 
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The results were exactly as expected, the only region that was not significantly influenced 
by geographical pressure were those schools in the Northeast.  The reliance on private education 
and the subsequent reduction of political pressure translates into a null result for regional 
diffusion with the region of the Northeast.  Yet regional pressure remains highly significant in all 
other areas within the country.   
7.1.2 University Variables 
In light of the significance for regional diffusion, it is not surprising that the only university level 
variable that proved to be important is the percentage of government appointed trustees.  
Obviously tuition is a policy that reaches beyond the parameters of each institution and is 
influenced heavily by the priorities at the state government level.  Yet the surprising result is that 
as the number of politically appointed trustees increased, the more likely tuition prices increased. 
This is the exact opposite from what one would expect and differs from the conclusion drawn 
from Lowry (2001).  The difference was not substantial, but nonetheless in a direction that 
deserves further attention.   
 
7.1.3 State Variables 
 
Interestingly the only state variable that proved to be significant was the partisanship 
measurement. However the results were the opposite of the hypothesis. Instead of confirming the 
assumption that a state controlled by Republicans would be more likely to adopt the privatization 
policies since it would assist universities in becoming more financially self sufficient, the results 
showed that a university in a state controlled by Democrats would be more likely to raise tuition.  
The negative direction of the coefficient shows that for every state government institution 
(governorship, upper house, or lower house) that is controlled by Republicans, there is 
approximately a 45% less chance that the tuition policy would be adopted.  A possible 
explanation for this surprising result is that raising tuition is viewed by Republican policy-
makers as less about government intervention and more about family expenses.  Even though a 
rise in tuition would reduce the need for state appropriations, it would also negatively affect 
family budgets, an area that is deeply embedded in the Republican agenda. 
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7.2 CONCLUSION 
The final results of this model were the most surprising of the three.  The robustness of regional 
diffusion indicated that the policy of tuition is unlike the other two dependent variables examined 
in this dissertation.  I believe the political sensitivity of the issue is the driving force behind the 
unexpected results.  The importance of educational affordability pushes this policy outside of the 
parameters of university administration and more squarely under the auspices of state 
government.  However it was very interesting to note that the affects of regional pressure were 
felt asymmetrically depending on the geographical region.  This revelation deserves future 
attention since it better explains the reason behind the lack of peer pressure. 
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8.0  CHAPTER EIGHT: CASE STUDIES IN ESTABLISHING TECH TRANSFER 
OFFICES 
The results presented in Chapter 5 show that peer diffusion is statistically significant in 
determining why a university establishes a TTO . In other words, one university’s decision to 
initiate a technology transfer policy heavily influences other universities within their specific 
peer group to also adopt the policy.  In addition, three other factors help explain some of the 
variance in establishing this policy, mainly the presence of a medical school, being classified as 
an extensive institution, and greater university autonomy from state government.   
In order to supplement these statistical findings, a series of elite interviews were 
conducted with current and past university administrators and technology transfer employees at a 
select sample of universities.  The primary objective of the interviews was to get the subjects 
perspective on the key influences (either at the local, institutional, state, or national level) that 
helped determine their university’s decision to formally establish a TTO?19   
 In order to choose the universities to profile while controlling for selection bias, a simple 
most-different-systems design was implemented.  As a result, four universities were identified 
that differed in the expected timing versus the actual timing of the establishment of their TTO.  
The expected timing was drawn primarily from the university’s reputation score, assuming that a 
university with a higher score (hence more prestigious) would be more likely to establish a TTO 
at an earlier date,  since a greater proportion of their peers would have already implemented one.  
Conversely a university with a low reputation score would be expected to innovate at a later 
stage since fewer of its peers would have already established a TTO. On the other hand, the 
actual timing was determined according to the specific year that the university established an 
office overseeing the responsibilities of technology transfer.  Two of the selected institutions 
                                                 
19 The definition of establishing a technology transfer office is “the year in which (an) institution assigned at least 
0.5 professional full time employee in support of technology transfer activities” according to the questionnaire 
conducted by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM).  
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were expected to be true policy entrepreneurs based on their high reputation scores. However, 
only one was in actuality an entrepreneur (University of Washington), while the other was a 
laggard (University of Pittsburgh).  The other two institutions were selected according to their 
low reputation rankings, and thus were both expected to be late innovators.  While one of the 
institutions proved to be a laggard as expected (University of Louisville), the other university in 
this category had surprisingly established a technology transfer office at a relatively early date 
(University of Alabama at Birmingham) (see table 8.1).  
 
 
Table 8.1: Expectation vs. Actual Timing of TTO Adoption 
 
 Entrepreneur (Actual) Laggard (Actual) 
Entrepreneur (Expected) University of Washington University of Pittsburgh 
Laggard (Expected) University of Alabama-Birmingham University of Louisville 
 
 
Contact was made with a wide variety of individuals connected to these four universities 
and their technology transfer operations.  Interviews were conducted with Deans, Provosts, 
Faculty, Directors of Technology Transfer Offices, Trustees, and in one case even the Chancellor 
of the University.20  In the end, a tremendous amount of information was collected regarding the 
determinants that significantly influenced the formal decision to establish a TTO at each of the 
selected universities. 
 This chapter is divided into six sections.  The first four sub-chapters give detailed 
profiles of the universities selected for the elite interviews along with the interview results, 
beginning with the University of Washington and followed by the University of Pittsburgh, 
University of Alabama-Birmingham, and University of Louisville.  While the primary objective 
of these interviews was to uncover why each university chose to establish a TTO at the time they 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that almost all of the senior administrators I interviewed wanted to speak “off the record”.  
Many felt uncomfortable discussing the process by which they select particular policies and, more importantly, 
drawing comparisons of themselves to other institutions. For this reason I did not identify anyone by name. 
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did, the interview information also helps to begin answering some of the critical questions 
related to the phenomenon of punctuated equilibrium, a theory which is explained in the fifth 
sub-chapter.  Finally this chapter concludes with a discussion of the prominent determinants that 
supported the empirical findings and identifies the influences that may not have been adequately 
specified in my quantitative models. 
8.1 CASE STUDIES 
8.1.1 Case Study #1: University of Washington  
The University of Washington (UW) has a premier TTO.21 Whether judged by the number of 
companies spawned (over 200 in the last 20 years), patents applied (178 in FY 2005), or 
innovations licensed (109 in FY 2005), it routinely ranks among the most successful operations 
in the country (Kwiram, 2005).  Further evidence is noted in the annual report of the Association 
of University Technology Managers (AUTM), which ranks the University of Washington in the 
top 5 of U.S. universities in the number of licenses and options executed (ranked 5th), the number 
of licenses and options yielding income (ranked 5th), and the total number of start-ups established 
between 1996-2000 (ranked 4th) (2003).   In sum the University of Washington competes with 
the very best research universities in the country, both public or private, in the field of 
technology transfer. 
 So why did the institutional leaders at the University of Washington decide to 
venture into the technology transfer arena in the first place?  As can be seen in Figure 8.2, the 
University of Washington was one of the first schools to formally establish a TTO, even when 
compared to the other elite public research universities that formulate the University of 
Washington’s peer group22. This observation raises the important question of what were the 
                                                 
21 Technically the office of technology transfer at the University of Washington is comprised of two licensing 
departments, “Invention Licensing” and “Digital Ventures”. 
22 The University of Washington’s peer group consists of the following institutions (based on their average 
reputation score): UC-Berkeley, Michigan, Virginia, UCLA, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Georgia Tech, Texas, 
Illinois, Indiana, Penn State, UC-San Diego, William & Mary, Purdue, UC-Davis, Minnesota, Ohio State, Colorado, 
and Iowa.   
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significant factors that led to the University of Washington to the institutional innovation of 
formally adopting a policy of technology transfer.  
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Years
# 
of
 T
TO
s 
E
st
ab
lis
he
d
Univ. of 
Washigton
 
 
Figure 8.1: # of TTO Established by University of Washington’s Peer Group 
 
 
The following sections present the results of the interviews at the University of Washington 
which help to answer this question. 
8.1.1.1 Local Economy and Leadership Three key determinants were routinely raised 
throughout the interviews with elite subjects from the University of Washington as vital to the 
progression and ultimate establishment of the university’s TTO, the first is the local economy.  
While it is difficult in 2007 to think of Seattle as a depressed area, in the late 1970’s it was a 
region struggling to diversify its declining economy beyond its two major employers: Boeing 
and the sea ports.  Boeing in particular was struggling with a sagging airplane market that they 
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had saturated during the 1960s.  As one newspaper columnist wrote,”(Seattle) battered by the 
misfortunes of the area's largest employer and by a national business slump coupled with 
inflation, the region entered the longest and deepest recession since the Great Depression” 
(Boswell and McConaghy, 1996). This dire situation forced civic leaders to seek alternative 
strategies for economic development and job creation. Since many of the political and business 
leaders of the region were also involved in some capacity with the University, it became a focal 
point for this objective.   
In particular two University Regents and local businessmen, Tom Cable and Hunter 
Simpson, were key proponents in using the research that was being conducted on the 
University’s campus to help spur company development for the Seattle area. As Regents of the 
University they were aware of the type of promising research that was being produced by the 
faculty, and as entrepreneurs were aware of the potential revenue it could generate if properly 
marketed.   Mr. Cable and Mr. Hunter, along with other civic leaders (including Bill Gates Sr.), 
began to push the university administration to recognize the potential financial benefits of 
technology transfer and its growing importance to the sustainability of the region.  Fortunately 
the administration listened and soon began to adequately support the establishment of a TTO 
through an increase in funding and recruitment of experienced administrators.   Simply, the 
exogenous pressure of the failing local economy (a non-institutional issue) encouraged the 
university to adopt the institutional policy of technology transfer.   
8.1.1.2 Peer Diffusion The second reason often cited in the interviews for the establishment of 
the TTO at the University of Washington can be loosely labeled as “peer influence”.  As 
discussed, pressure was placed upon the administration by civic and institutional leaders to 
utilize the research being created on campus to help generate revenue for both the university and 
the city.  In an effort to accomplish this task the university administration sought to recruit 
experienced faculty and administrators familiar with this process of technology transfer.  
Naturally, they looked to other universities that had already entered into this new venture.  In the 
mid-1970’s very few schools had formally established a TTO and employed administrators who 
understood the ramifications of intellectual property.  Therefore, the University of Washington 
looked to one of its peer institutions for guidance and in 1976, recruited Dr. Irving Shain, 
professor of Chemistry, from the University of Wisconsin to be its Provost and Vice President. 
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While at Wisconsin, Dr. Shain had worked closely with the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation (WARF), one of the first official university-related TTOs in the country.  WARF was 
established in 1925 to manage the intellectual property around the discovery that would 
eventually eliminate the disease of rickets (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).  His familiarity with 
WARF was one of the critical reasons why senior leaders at the University of Washington 
recruited Dr. Shain to help lead their challenging research agenda.   Once Dr. Shain arrived in 
Seattle, he quickly became involved in developing the operation from simply a research office to 
a full functioning patent office that assisted professors looking to enter the private marketplace.   
Unfortunately, Dean Shain’s tenure was short lived for he was soon recruited back to 
Madison to be their next President.  However, during his time at the University of Washington he 
was credited for pushing the technology transfer operation out of its passive state and into a more 
comprehensive department that actively connected research being conducted on campus with 
private firms seeking profitable applications.  Not surprisingly, within six years of Dr. Shain’s 
arrival, the University of Washington established an official TTO and hired a senior staff 
administrator to oversee the department on a fulltime basis.  In sum, peer diffusion (in the form 
of Dr. Shain) had a significant influence in the eventual development of the technology transfer 
office at the University of Washington since his past experiences with intellectual property at the 
University of Wisconsin (a peer institution) played a major role in his recruitment and hiring at 
Washington.  In summary, it was not coincidental that Dr. Shain came from a peer university to 
the University of Washington. Instead, it is evidence of a deliberate and systematic search for an 
administrator from a school that had already established a technology transfer policy in order to 
venture into this new area and help maintain their position as an elite research university. 
8.1.1.3 Medical School The last major influence routinely mentioned during the interviews was 
the importance of the medical school and the research being produced by its faculty.  As 
mentioned above, the University of Washington was assembling a highly regarded and 
experienced administrative staff to run their new office of technology transfer.  Another critical 
element needed for a successful operation was a steady stream of research that was attractive to 
local industries and entrepreneurs. This is turn would generate a demand that would allow the 
TTO to continue its momentum and gain popularity among the key administrators within the 
university who were still skeptical of this new (and expensive) venture. Fortunately during the 
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early 1980’s, when the technology transfer office at  the University of Washington was still in its 
infancy stage, the research areas of molecular biology and bio-technology were beginning to 
become extremely popular at the university as researchers were identifying broad and potentially 
lucrative applications.  These areas were also very popular in the medical industry which made 
the medical school research particularly attractive for commercialization.   
An early example of this type of research was the identification by university faculty of 
the area within a yeast gene where the process of producing proteins begins. This discovery 
allowed the researchers to create a bio-tech company that would produce human insulin, a highly 
applicable discovery in the medical industry.  In universities without a medical school, this type 
of cutting-edge research was not being produced. Therefore, it was a substantial competitive 
advantage for the University of Washington to already have a highly reputable medical school 
that was filled with leading researchers who simply needed an education on how to bring their 
research from the lab to the marketplace. 
8.1.1.4 Bayh—Dole Act While the three determinants cited above (peer pressure, medical 
school, and the local economy) were clearly instrumental in the establishment of the University’s 
TTO, there are also noticeable absences from the list of influences.   In all of the interviews it 
was cited that the Bayh-Dole Act was not a major factor in determining the establishment of the 
TTO at the University of Washington.  In fact, very few faculty and administrators were aware of 
the legislation at the time of its enactment, let alone its potential ramifications.  Naturally the 
administrators directly connected to office of research were aware of its implications and the 
guidelines it presented, but few individuals beyond that department were familiar with the Act.  
It became the responsibility of the administrators in the newly formed TTO to help educate the 
rest of the campus community of the Bayh-Dole Act and its potential benefits to the individual 
researcher and University of Washington as a whole.  It can be concluded based on the limited 
knowledge of the Act that even though the TTO was officially established at the University of 
Washington at the same time as the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, it did not play a significant part 
in the deliberations about whether to establish an office.   It was only after the policy was 
accepted did more faculty and administrators begin to comprehend the implications of the 
legislation. 
 
 82 
In sum, the University of Washington was ahead of the competition because of a 
confluence of vital factors. First they were pressured to address the problem of boosting the 
regional economy in a way in which the university could also increase its revenues, mainly 
through technology transfer.  Secondly, in order to achieve this goal, the pragmatic leadership of 
the University of Washington smartly recruited administrators from peer institutions with 
technology transfer experience from that could help the university to enter into a new venture 
that it (and most other universities) had previously not undertaken.  Lastly, it already had the 
most critical resource, a strong medical school, which was generating commercially viable 
research and made the establishment of a TTO much easier for the university.  
8.1.2 Case Study #2: University of Pittsburgh 
In 2005 the University of Pittsburgh’s (Pitt) TTO23 ranked among the top-10 universities in the 
number of companies generated by faculty (AUTM, 2005).  They outperformed such noteworthy 
universities as Cornell, University of Minnesota, and Harvard. In addition, the TTO ranked 
among the very best in the number of licenses it issued for its patents with a total of 53 in 2005 
alone – again exceeding the outputs created by highly respected universities such as Penn State 
and Michigan (ibid). These accomplishments are particularly impressive when considering that 
the operation at the University of Pittsburgh has been in official existence for less than 15 years.  
As can be seen from Figure 8.3, the University of Pittsburgh lagged behind many of its peers in 
terms of its decision to formally establish a technology transfer office.24   It was not until 1992 
that a full-time employee was given the sole responsibility of overseeing the process of 
technology transfer (AUTM, 2003).  At that time,14 of its peers had established an office, 
placing the University of Pittsburgh at the latter end of the ‘S’ curve.  
 
 
                                                 
23  University of Pittsburgh’s technology transfer office is officially called, Office of Technology Management 
(OTM) 
24 The University of Pittsburgh’s peer group consists of the following institutions (based on their average reputation 
score): Colorado, Maryland, Arizona, Florida, Michigan State, UC-Irvine, Texas A&M, Kansas, Oregon, Georgia, 
UC-Santa Barbara, SUNY-Stony Brook, Virginia Tech, Iowa State, Arizona State, Missouri, Massachusetts, Miami 
(OH), and Tennessee. 
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Figure 8.2: # of TTOs Established by University of Pittsburgh’s Peer Group 
 
 
The fact that so many of its peers had already established a TTO leads to the question of 
whether the determinants that influenced the administrators at the University of Pittsburgh were 
the same as those that encouraged the early adopters (i.e. University of Washington) or were the 
variables different? A difference in the influential factors may explain the late entry into the 
domain of technology transfer. In the answers provided by the interviewees at the University, 
only one major factor was uniformly cited as the influential factor for the establishing of a TTO - 
the research being conducted at the medical school. However, it can also be argued that the 
fundamental choice of the type of research that was chosen to be the primary output of the 
medical school is also evidence of peer pressure.  Interestingly, it was a variable that was missing 
from the decision-making process that appears to be the reason why the University of Pittsburgh 
lagged so far behind its peers in terms of when they established a TTO – mainly the lack of 
strong local leadership. 
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8.1.2.1 Medical School All of the individuals interviewed identified Pitt’s highly ranked medical 
school as the primary impetus for the establishment of their TTO. More specifically, they called 
out the fundamental shift in focus from clinical studies to more applied research as the main 
reason for  the creation of a department to oversee technology transfer in a more established 
manner.  For decades the University of Pittsburgh’s medical school was internationally known 
and respected, primarily for the extensive clinical trails the school conducted, the most famous 
being the polio vaccine trials led by Dr. Jonas Salk.   While this type of research kept the 
reputation of the school in good standing, it was not particularly lucrative from a revenue 
perspective as can be seen by the amount of federal research and development funding that the 
University received from 1980-1990, which totaled slightly more than $87 million (Graham and 
Diamond, 1997, 223).  This amount placed the University of Pittsburgh only 23rd among 
Research I universities, lagging behind many other public universities in their peer group such as 
University of North Carolina, University of Illinois, and University of California at San Diego.  
The lack of federal financial support raised concern among the administration as they struggled 
to provide adequate facilities and retain promising faculty member and resulted in a 
comprehensive review and study of alternatives to address this growing issue – including the 
potential of changing the research agenda for the medical school.    
 Finally, in the mid-1990s, a decision was made to place greater  emphasis on applied 
research that would garner more attention from the federal government. This change in focus 
was encapsulated in the recruitment and subsequent hiring of Dr. Art Levine as the new Dean of 
the Medical School.  Prior to his arrival at the University of Pittsburgh., Dr. Levine had been a 
senior member of the National Institute of Health, which gave him tremendous insight on the 
type of research that would allure federal funding and could be a financial windfall for the 
medical school and the university as a whole.  Dr. Levine’s impact in terms of increased federal 
appropriations for the University of Pittsburgh was immediate as evidence by the fact that as 
early as 2002, the university moved into the top-10 in total NIH funding, placing it 8th among all 
universities with a total of $308 million.  The increase in federal funding subsequently 
heightened the need for a professional staff that could effectively commercialize the new 
research.  In the end, this change in the institutional goal of the medical school was the one of the 
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fundamental reasons for the formal establishment of an office of technology transfer at the 
University of Pittsburgh.25
8.1.2.2   Peer Diffusion  One could argue that the shift in the medical school’s focus and the 
hiring of Dr. Levine also highlights a more subtle form of “peer pressure” to create a TTO.  
Many of the university administrators had recognized that the University of Pittsburgh’s low 
ranking in terms of overall federal funding was making it less competitive than its peer 
institutions.  This is a less direct example of peer pressure as compared to the narrative told by 
the administrators at the University of Washington, who identified a specific faculty member 
(Dr. Shain) from a specific peer institution (University of Wisconsin) to be the primary catalyst 
in developing their operation.  However, Dr. Levine, coming from a federal government agency, 
was still indirectly knowledgeable of the type of research being conducted at Pittsburgh’s peer 
institutions and implemented this knowledge in helping build the TTO.  While this may not fit 
the common model of a faculty member bringing his/her specific expertise from one peer 
institution to the next, but it can clearly be defined as an example of policies being adopted with 
the intention of remaining competitive, if not superior to other similar institutions.     
8.1.2.3 Local Leadership Another fundamental difference between the University of 
Washington and the University of Pittsburgh was the role of local leadership at the institution.  
As discussed, the University of Washington benefited tremendously from the leadership of their 
trustees who understood both the needs of the local community and the dividends that could be 
provided by to both the city and university by the research being conducted by the faculty.   
Unfortunately for the University of Pittsburgh, there were no trustees or civic leaders that were 
cited as driving or assisting in the development of their TTO. In fact, at the University of 
Pittsburgh, the opposite was routinely noted as the local foundations were very late in supporting 
the offices at the major Pittsburgh universities.   
This is particularly puzzling since the city and region of Pittsburgh was (and is) dealing 
with many of the same economic issues that the city of Seattle was attempting to address in the 
                                                 
25 It should be noted that the University of Pittsburgh officially had a full time employee solely working on 
technology transfer responsibilities in 1992.  However almost all of the senior administrators interviewed identified 
1996-97 as the more accurate year of their entry into the field since that is when the shift in the medical school’s 
priorities began to take root. 
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1970s – mainly the need for a diversified economy after years of  relying too heavily on a narrow 
scope of industries. While city and institutional leaders in Seattle recognized the economic 
benefit that could be provided by intellectual property and drove the development of a 
department connecting the two entities, this story did not play out in Southwest Pennsylvania 
where the wealthy foundations, led by many of the city’s most powerful individuals, did not 
recognize this same opportunity for an alternative revenue source.26  It was not until the latter 
years of the 1990s that the local foundations began to better understand and recognize the 
possibilities for regional economic improvement through the spawning of companies by the local 
universities.   
To summarize the interviews, the University of Pittsburgh was a laggard due to two 
primary factors. The first was that prior to the arrival of Dr. Levine, the research being produced 
within the medical school was not particularly attractive to outside funding sources, which in 
turn generated little need for a more comprehensive department overseeing intellectual property.  
The second factor was the short-sightedness of Pittsburgh’s civic leadership, which did not 
realize the economic benefits that could be gained by supporting the commercialization of the 
research being conducted on the campuses of their local universities. Together, while these two 
forces ultimately led to a shift in mission and a subsequent adoption of a TTO, they also played 
into the delay of the creation of such an office as compared with the University of Pittsburgh’s 
peer institutions. . 
8.1.3 Case Study #3: The University of Alabama at Birmingham 
The TTO at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) does not rank among the top 
intellectual property departments in such critical measures as the number of companies spawned 
or the number of licenses and options executed as compared to the aforementioned offices at the 
UW and Pitt.27  This would be expected since UAB is traditionally viewed as an institution 
lagging behind many public universities in regards to critical attributes such as student test 
                                                 
26 Ironically huge sums of “Pittsburgh money” were directed to technology transfer firms in other parts of the 
country . The most notable being Henry Hillman, one of the first investors in Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers 
(KPCB)of Silicon Valley, now one of the most prominent venture capital partnerships in the world (Kenny and 
Florida, 2000).  
27 The official name of UAB’s office of technology transfer is “the UAB Research Foundation”. 
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scores, doctorates awarded, and wealth (Lombardi et al., 2005).  This is why it is surprising is 
that the UAB administration determined at a relatively early date to establish a TTO (1987) as 
can be seen by Figure 8.4 below.28  This raises the question about what inspired the institutional 
leaders at UAB to enact the technology transfer policy before many of its peer institutions.   
Three interrelated factors were commonly cited by the administrators contacted for an 
interview at UAB.  The factors were (1) UAB’s medical school (2) the NASA facility in nearby 
Huntsville and (3) Dr. Lawrence DeLucas, faculty member and former astronaut.   It was Dr. 
Lucas who was routinely cited as the primary actor who connected the research being conducted 
at NASA with the facilities at the UAB medical school.  This powerful triumvirate later would 
draw the attention of the Alabama state government when they chose the Birmingham area to be 
the focal point for the entire state’s economic development plans.   
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Figure 8.3: # of TTOs Established by UAB’s Peer Group 
 
 
                                                 
28 The University of Alabama at Birmingham’s peer group consists of the following institutions (based on their 
average reputation score): George Mason, Temple, South Carolina, New Mexico, New Hampshire, Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, Virginia Commonwealth, Louisiana State, Missouri-Rolla, Rhode Island, Alabama, Cincinnati, Texas 
Tech, IUPUI, Hawaii, Texas-Dallas, San Diego State, Wayne State, and West Virginia. 
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8.1.3.1 Medical School and Faculty Leadership The UAB medical school was broadly 
identified during the interviews as the main catalyst for the establishment of the TTO.  
Administrators cited the numerous companies sprouted from the medical school with assistance 
from the UAB’s TTO.  Yet similar to the narrative at Pitt, there was also an underlying story 
about the medical school that better explained the decision-making process behind the policy 
adoption.  As previously noted at Pitt, the medical school was cited as the primary impetus 
behind the formal creation of their TTO.  More accurately, it was the decision to shift attention to 
more applied research over basic clinical research within the medical school that ultimately 
spurred the development of the TTO.  While it may appear on the surface that the medical school 
at UAB was a central determinant in the establishment of their TTO, in actuality it was the 
relationship that the medical school had with NASA and its facility in Huntsville that truly 
accelerated the administration’s decision to enter into the academic domain of intellectual 
property.   
As mentioned in the profile of the UW, the 1980’s was a critical time in the development 
of bio-technology.  Research in this burgeoning field was reaching new heights and receiving 
greater attention from the federal government and other non-university funding sources. A 
handful of fortunate universities were able to take advantage of these new funding opportunities 
with the assistance of their medical school, and UAB was no exception.  However for UAB it 
was not simply the research being conducted within their medical school that was attractive to 
funding sources, it was also its collaboration with the researchers at NASA.  This relationship, 
particularly in regards to bio-technology, was credited to former astronaut, UAB faculty 
member, and UAB graduate, Dr. Lawrence DeLucas, who was identified as the primary 
institutional leader in the eventual establishment of the TTO.  Due to Dr. DeLucas appoints at 
both NASA and the UAB, he was very aware of the type of research being conducted at both 
facilities.  He championed the efforts to have both institutions collaborate on more projects, 
particularly assignments from the federal government. So while the medical school and the 
NASA facility were instrumental in producing the type of research conducive to technology 
transfer, it was Dr. DeLucas who was the central figure in developing the operation. 29  
                                                 
29  Due to time constraints, an interview with Dr. DeLucas has not yet occurred.  However future arrangements have 
been made for contact and thus a more complete explanation is forthcoming regarding the development of UAB’s 
TTO. 
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8.1.4 Case Study #4: The University of Louisville 
The TTO at the University of Louisville is still a relatively small operation as compared to the 
departments at other peer universities.  In the last fiscal year the University of Louisville 
awarded only six licenses and option agreements (as compared to 54 by Pitt) and brought in a 
total of $2 million in revenue (as compared to almost $12 million at Pitt) (AUTM, 2006).  This is 
not surprising since the University of Louisville, like the UAB, has not been historically known 
as a highly prestigious institution, which in turn has hindered its ability to attract leading 
researchers and solicit outside funding (Lombardi et al, 2005).  However, unlike UAB, the 
administration of the University of Louisville did not deviate from expectation and did not act as 
a policy entrepreneur by establishing a TTO at an early stage in the evolution of intellectual 
property.  On the contrary, Louisville, as expected, was a laggard, particularly as compared to its 
competitors as can seen in Figure 8.5.  
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Figure 8.4: # of TTOs Established by University of Louisville’s Peer Group 
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This begs the question - what were the variables that ultimately swayed the 
administration at Louisville to finally establish an office to oversee issues related to technology 
transfer?   The answers provided through the interviews were twofold.  The first was the creation 
of the Research Challenge Trust Fund by the Kentucky state government. The main objective of 
the program, more commonly known as the “Bucks for Brains”, was to improve the economic 
development in the state by creating a matching-gift program where as the state government 
would match private donations designated toward university research.  The second substantial 
factor in Louisville’s decision was the fundamental shift in mission in the 1990s from being a 
regional institution with the primary responsibility of educating the local citizenry to the 
expansive goal of becoming a national research university.  Additionally, it was mentioned that 
the critical factor that helps explain Louisville’s late enactment of the policy is the fact that the 
university is not the sole overseer of the University Hospital.  Instead it is a member of a 
partnership with three other healthcare entities, thus diluting the direct impact of the hospital on 
the university’s research agenda. 
8.1.4.1 State Economic Development In an attempt to improve the economic development 
within the state, in 1997 the Kentucky Senate passed a series of legislation that tried to accelerate 
the research capabilities of the universities within their higher education system. The primary 
goal was to help improve the state economy by strategically utilizing the public universities as 
economic engines for further growth and development.  A key component to this reform was the 
state’s creation of the Research Challenge Trust Fund, better known as the “Bucks for Brains” 
program, which matched state funds to private donations designated toward specified university 
research.  From 1998-2005 Kentucky legislators invested $350 million in the Trust Fund, an 
amount equal almost one-third of the appropriations allocated to Louisville. As intended, the new 
revenue stream allowed Louisville to recruit faculty and researchers who previously they were 
unable to attract due to a lack of resources.  The prime example often cited was Dr. Nancy 
Martin, a molecular biologist who currently serves as the Senior Vice President for Research.  
Dr. Martin had previously been at the University of Minnesota, one of the true pioneering 
institutions in the field of intellectual property.  Similar to the story regarding Dr. Shain at UW, 
Louisville administrators cited Dr. Martin’s expertise from Minnesota as one of the primary 
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reasons for her recruitment and her experience has been extremely beneficial in the development 
of their burgeoning operation.   
Overall this acceleration in faculty recruitment has had an immediate impact on the 
activity generated from the TTO.  In regards to patent applications Louisville has gone from one 
in 1997 (prior to the infusion of state money) to 61 in 2006; patents awarded has increased from 
3 in 1997 to 9 in 2006; and patent reimbursement income has risen from zero dollars in 1997 to 
over $200,000 in 2006.  In simple terms the state appropriations generated enough of an 
incentive for Louisville to accelerate their own private fundraising, which in turn attracted top 
researchers who became the catalyst for the establishment of their TTO.   It should be noted that 
the “Bucks for Brains” program did not specifically state that Louisville (or any of the other state 
supported institutions) had to create a TTO.  The decision to do so was still an act by the 
university administration at the institutional level though the Kentucky legislature provided great 
incentive. 
8.1.4.2 Hospital While all of the other universities profiled identified their hospitals as one of the 
primary factors in the eventual establishment of their technology transfer offices, Louisville did 
not because surprisingly, the University Hospital is not solely controlled by the institution.  
Unlike the arrangements at the other three profiled institutions where they are the primary 
overseers of the research being conducted within the medical school, at Louisville the 
responsibility is shared by multiple medical entities.  This unusual partnership was identified as 
one of the significant obstacles in pushing the university’s overall research agenda.  While the 
University Hospital has been beneficial in recruiting top faculty and has spawned potentially 
lucrative research, the additional institutions managing the hospital has caused bureaucratic 
coordination problems. This has translated into an impediment in dramatically developing the 
entire operation of intellectual property. 
8.2 PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM AND POLICY ENTREPRENEURS  
Based on the information gleaned from the elite interviews, there were two commonalities 
between the four universities profiled in terms of the development of their TTOs.  First was the 
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importance of an exogenous force that altered the traditional thinking of university 
administrators (i.e. the decline of the local or state economy, loss of federal appropriations, etc.).  
The second commonality was the critical role of specific actors in introducing and building the 
technology transfer department within the institutions (i.e. Hunter Simpson, Dr. Shain, Dr. 
Levine, etc.).  This observation as to how important exogenous events and specific actors are on 
influencing change at an institution, taps into the study of punctuated equilibrium and the role of 
policy entrepreneurs (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  An additional argument can be made that 
UW and the UAB possessed true policy entrepreneurs (Hunter Simpson and Tom Cable) who 
acted as agenda-setters (Kingdon, 1984).  While Pitt and Louisville simply possessed 
“institutional builders” (Marcussen and Peters, N.d.), who due to arriving on the scene at a later 
stage simply institutionalized the policy that had already been enacted.  
The theory of punctuated equilibrium is rooted in the fundamental question of how does 
major policy change happen if incrementalism is the main pace of the policy process.  Policy 
making is traditionally characterized as stabile and slow, which scholars have generally 
attributed to structural design (Kingdon, 1984; Cobb and Elder, 1983, Meier, 1985; Sabatier, 
1987).   The actors and organizations (or “subsystems”) embedded in design of institutions rarely 
have the incentive to make drastic changes to the policy domain where they possess a 
monopolization.  This fact, coupled with a political environment that generates significant 
obstacles for any opposition to become a major player in the decision making process, results in 
a steady pace of only slight adjustments to existing policies.   However, as Baumgartner and 
Jones note, sudden bursts of change do occur in policymaking, a reality that is not well explained 
by the theory of incrementalism.  Hence the scholars raise the question – what breaks the periods 
of stasis and can account for the drastic changes in policy direction?    
One of the critical answers suggested is a shift in policy image or issue redefinition.  This 
is typically accomplished by a major exogenous event that brings attention and pressure to a 
specific policy and the subsystem controlling it.  This dramatic event opens a window of 
opportunity for new political and institutional actors (or “policy entrepreneurs”), who previously 
remained on the sidelines, to enter into the policy debate and “insist on rewriting the rules, and 
on changing the balance of power that will be reinforced by new institutional structures” 
(Sabatier, 1999, 101).   The result is a change in the equilibrium of the policy domain and 
consequently a new set of policy options available to the institution.    
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The narratives provided by the interviews confirmed the accuracy of the punctuated 
equilibrium theory since in each case an event or force outside of the inner-workings of the 
universities punctured the traditional institutional thinking.  At UW, the declining regional 
economy forced the university to rethink its role in the context of the Seattle economy.   The 
university recognized that it needed to shift from a passive participant to being an active provider 
of jobs and resources.  Pitt had its traditional perspective altered with the realization that stagnant 
federal appropriations were causing a competitive imbalance in recruiting top faculty and 
researchers.  In both cases, a shock to the institutional system opened an opportunity for a new 
policy to be created and implemented.   
Although the types of actors each university possessed was slightly different, the 
importance of specific actors at each university also became critical in the actual establishment 
of each TTO. Drawing from the work of Marcussen and Peters (N.d), the argument can be made 
that only the UW and UAB possessed true policy entrepreneurs (“innovators”), while the other 
two universities simply had “institutional builders”.   The key difference is that at UW (Tom 
Cable and Hunter Simpson) and UAB (Dr. DeLucas), the actors brought the policy idea of 
technology transfer to the administration, introducing them to a relatively new policy idea.   
Before their active involvement, the knowledge of technology licensing among the university 
administrators was rather limited.  Therefore Mr. Cable, Mr. Simpson, and Dr. DeLucas follow 
the standard definition of a policy entrepreneur as “people who see to initiate dynamic policy 
change” (Mintrom, 1997, 739).   
On the other hand, the important actors identified by Pitt (Dr. Levine) and Louisville (Dr. 
Martin) were administrators that were recruited to run the offices once the policy of technology 
transfer had already been accepted by the institution.  Thus they played the role of being 
“institution-builders” since they were making institutional choices “once a direction for change 
has been pointed out” (Marcussen and Peters).  This critical difference between the type of actors 
may be an additional factor that helps explain the timing of the policy adoption since both UW 
and UAB were early innovators, while both Pitt and Louisville were laggards compared to their 
peers. 
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8.3 CONCLUSION 
The variables that proved to be statistically significant in the quantitative model (see Chapter 5) 
were verified during my interviews with key administrators at the selected universities.  Without 
question, the most critical of the determinants proved to be the existence of a hospital.  The three 
universities with a hospital (UW, Pitt, and UAB) all cited their medical school (and more 
specifically the research being conducted within it) as one of the primary catalysts for deciding 
to build a TTO.  The financial opportunities that the hospitals provided were too enticing for the 
administrators to ignore at each school.    
In addition the hypothesis that peer diffusion would also have a noticeable affect in the 
overall decision making process to establish a technology transfer office proved to be true.  
However, how peer pressure evolved for each institution was slightly different.  For UW, peer 
diffusion came in the form of a new Dean from a peer institution (Dr. Shain from Wisconsin), 
who was able to apply his knowledge and expertise to his new home institution. Pitt felt the peer 
pressure because of their lack of federal funding and subsequent inability to compete for top 
faculty and students.  Finally, UAB and Louisville were affected by their state governments’ 
realization that economic development needed to be a higher priority.  In all cases, a general 
cognition of where their institution stood in relation to other universities was a major force in the 
eventual implementation of the technology transfer policy. 
However, it should be noted that the quantitative model did not take into account local 
issues, such as the economy.  Based on the interview outcomes, local factors played a substantial 
role in the institutional decision making process.  In the cases of the UW and Pitt, the difference 
in civic leadership had a substantial affect on the timing of the establishment of the TTO.  While 
in the cases of Louisville and UAB, the intervention of their state governments to promote local 
economic development played a major role.  In future research it would be important to construct 
a variable to try to capture the local conditions of each institution to improve the modeling.   
 95 
9.0  CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
9.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This dissertation answers the following question: which factors have caused three controversial 
revenue generating policies to spread and become adopted by public research universities? By 
conducting an event history analysis on three higher education policies (rising tuition, increasing 
private contributions, and establishing technology transfer offices), the research reveals that the 
initial hypothesis was correct in predicting that  peer diffusion has a statistically significant effect 
on determining the timing of when universities establish a TTO and initiate a comprehensive 
capital campaign.  Interestingly, the rising cost of tuition did not reinforce the hypothesis and 
could not be explained using a peer diffusion model.   Within the peer diffusion model 
institutional level variables are found to be instrumental in increasing the probability of 
innovation in terms of establishing a TTO.  The existence of a hospital has a major impact on the 
likelihood that a university will enact the policy of technology transfer as found by both the 
statistical models and the elite interviews.  Moreover, the governance structure, specifically a 
larger number of trustees and a longer tenure length for each trustee, negatively impacts the 
opportunity for the university administration to establish an office.  Conversely, none of the state 
level variables proves to have a substantial impact on TTO establishment.  The probability of 
innovation in regards to technology transfer remains unaffected regardless of the level of 
professionalism amongst the state legislature, average state income, or change in higher 
education appropriations.   
On the other hand, capital campaigns are affected by the decrease in state appropriations, 
proving that the claim that university administrators are being forced by the decisions of the state 
legislature to generate more private dollars may have validity.  Not surprisingly, being an 
extensive university strongly increased the probability of initiating a campaign.   
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Another interesting result was that the rising of tuition was positively affected by the 
percentage of politically appointed trustees.  The expectation was that government trustees 
would be reluctant to increase tuition prices due to voter backlash.  Lastly, as noted it was the 
only dependent variable that did not follow a peer diffusion model.   As discussed, this may be a 
result of how the variable was constructed or simply that it is a variable that is more susceptible 
to exogenous factors such as the regional economy.   
Overall, this research highlights the very interesting process of peer diffusion that has not 
been previously tested by diffusion scholars.  However, there remains one more critical question 
that must be asked before legitimizing the concept of peer diffusion – is this type of diffusion 
applicable to other institutions or has this dissertation simply revealed the unique process by 
which universities innovate?  The next sub-chapter provides three criteria (all of which have 
been discussed in previous chapters) that an institution must possess for peer diffusion to be 
applicable: a professional workforce, a cognitive hierarchy (or recognized ranking) within the 
field, and a national competition for the same resources.   If all three criteria are met, peer 
diffusion will have an impact on the spread of innovations and the model is applicable. The last 
sub-chapter will provide details on research that is currently being conducted in connection with 
this dissertation. 
9.2 IS PEER DIFFUSION GENERALIZABLE? 
This dissertation began by asking if the contiguous-state theory was generalizable to all public 
policy-making institutions.  The results of this research clearly show that this is not the case 
since universities prove to innovate via a different process.  Instead of regional diffusion, 
universities tend to adopt policies according to the decisions of their peer schools.   The next 
question is whether the theory of peer diffusion is generalizable or if it is strictly a unique 
process applicable only to universities.  Here the hypothesis is presented that if an institution 
meets the following three criteria, it too could potentially be influenced by peer pressure. 
First, the institution must possess a workforce that is highly professionalized (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).  As discussed in Chapter 3, an occupational field with employees trained 
from the same type of institution, possessing the same level of education, and following the same 
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rules for promotions and recognition will tend to homogenize due to normative pressures.  They 
will attempt to remain competitive by replicating the identical policies so as to retain the best 
talent within the occupational field, which directly leads to the second criteria. 
The second criterion that must be met is a strong cognitive hierarchy of the employees 
and/or the institutions within the occupational field.  This “ranking” has to exist for the 
aforementioned competition to retain and recruit the best talent.  For a competition to exist, the 
same rules must apply to all “contestants” (which is the argument in the first criteria), but in 
addition a public understanding of who is “winning” the competition must also be in existence.  
It allows the contestants to know which institutions they aspire to work for in their field 
(simultaneously it sends a message to institutions about where they want to recruit contestants 
for their institution).  Naturally for universities (and faculty within the universities) this is the 
information that annual rankings like the U.S. News and World Report provide. 
The last criterion that must be met for peer diffusion to be generally applicable to an 
institution is a competition amongst similar institutions for identical resources at the national 
level.  There must be an incentive or reason that an institution to look beyond their regional 
parameters for alternative policies.  As noted with universities, the national competition is for 
faculty and federal appropriations.  The intense pressure for these valuable commodities 
motivates universities to innovate in a similar fashion as their national peers. 
Based on the three aforementioned criteria, another type of institution where peer 
diffusion could be applicable is hospitals.  Hospitals are an institution where the primary 
employees, doctors, are clearly in a professionalized occupational field.  In addition, there is a 
known and accepted hierarchy of the best hospitals in the country, partly due to similar annual 
rankings by publications like the U.S. News and World Report.  Lastly, hospitals compete against 
each other at the national level for the best doctors and research allocations.  Hence it would not 
be surprising to find specific hospitals innovating based on decisions made by their peers.  Other 
institutions that deserve future testing of the peer diffusion model may include economic 
development agencies and national charities. 
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9.3 CURRENT DIFFUSION RESEARCH 
Currently research is being conducted that builds from the results presented in this dissertation.  
Weinstein and Krause (N.d) have begun to analyze the magnitude each institutional variable has 
on the peer diffusion process.  This is a critical next step in the research since this dissertation 
does not examine the effect the explanatory variables have on the timing of adoption.  Based on 
the results presented in Chapters 5-7, one can not measure the extent by which each variable 
influences each institution when they ultimately decide to innovate.  This leaves an incomplete 
picture because it is important to know whether some variables affect early adopters differently 
than late adopters.  By forwarding a theory of “transaction costs”, where the institutional 
variables are viewed as obstacles toward innovation, interaction terms are constructed to test 
their potential constraint on the effects of peer diffusion. For example, as can be noted in Figure 
9.1, the length of a university trustee’s tenure length has a much greater effect on later adopters 
(p=0.75 and p=1.00) as compared to early adopters (p=0.05 and 0.25).  In other words, the 
bureaucratic inertia hypothesized regarding long trustee tenure impacts universities who are late 
to adopt compared to their peers at a much greater rate than those universities that are the policy 
entrepreneurs of their peer group.  Overall, this additional research continues to validate the 
importance of understanding the role peer pressure has on decision-making. 
 
Figure 9.1 Effect of trustee length on establishing a TTO 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF UNIVERSITIES IN SAMPLE 
 
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT HUNTSVILLE SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CARBONDALE 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA BALL STATE UNIVERSITY 
AUBURN UNIVERSITY MAIN CAMPUS 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY-
INDIANAPOLIS 
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY AT THE TEMPE 
CAMPUS 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY-BLOOMINGTON 
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY 
NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS MAIN CAMPUS UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS MAIN CAMPUS 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-DAVIS WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-IRVINE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-RIVERSIDE 
LOUISIANA STATE UNIV & AG & MECH & HEBERT 
LAWS CTR 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SANTA BARBARA UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SANTA CRUZ UNIVERSITY OF MAINE 
SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND-BALTIMORE 
COUNTY 
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND-COLLEGE PARK 
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT DENVER UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-LOWELL 
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST 
COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN-ANN ARBOR 
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UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA-TWIN CITIES 
FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY-BOCA RATON UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MAIN CAMPUS 
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY 
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI 
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY 
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY-MAIN 
CAMPUS 
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST LOUIS 
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY-BOZEMAN 
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MANOA THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA-MISSOULA 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT LINCOLN 
UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA-RENO 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE-MAIN CAMPUS 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO-MAIN CAMPUS 
NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY 
SUNY AT ALBANY THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON 
SUNY AT BINGHAMTON THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
SUNY AT BUFFALO THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS 
SUNY AT STONY BROOK TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO TEXAS WOMAN'S UNIVERSITY 
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY AT RALEIGH UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA-MAIN CAMPUS UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT AND STATE 
AGRICULTURAL COLL 
UNIVERSITY OF AKRON MAIN CAMPUS COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN 
CAMPUS 
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI-MAIN CAMPUS OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE 
UNIV 
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KENT STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY 
MIAMI UNIVERSITY-OXFORD UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA-MAIN CAMPUS 
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY 
OHIO UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON-SEATTLE CAMPUS 
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY 
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON 
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE 
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA NORMAN CAMPUS UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING 
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY PURDUE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON  
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY  
INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA-MAIN 
CAMPUS 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS  
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH-MAIN CAMPUS  
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY  
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND  
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY  
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA-COLUMBIA  
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA  
UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS  
MIDDLE TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY  
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE  
TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY  
TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY-COMMERCE  
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON-UNIVERSITY PARK  
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS  
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF UNIVERSITIES IN SAMPLE SORTED BY AVERAGE RANKING 
 
RANK UNIVERSITY 
1.08 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY 
1.92 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN-ANN ARBOR 
3.17 UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA-MAIN CAMPUS 
3.5 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON 
4 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES 
5.25 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL 
6.33 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN 
6.92 THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
9.33 UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON-SEATTLE CAMPUS 
9.83 GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY-MAIN CAMPUS 
10.5 INDIANA UNIVERSITY-BLOOMINGTON 
11.08 PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
11.33 UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA-TWIN CITIES 
13.17 PURDUE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
13.92 COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
14.5 OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
15.42 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-DAVIS 
15.42 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO 
16.83 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 
17.75 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER 
19.08 UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND-COLLEGE PARK 
19.75 UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 
21.25 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 
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22.75 MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
23.08 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-IRVINE 
23.42 TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY 
27.42 UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS MAIN CAMPUS 
27.58 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH-MAIN CAMPUS 
28.08 UNIVERSITY OF OREGON 
28.33 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 
28.83 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SANTA BARBARA 
29.67 SUNY AT STONY BROOK 
30.83 VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIV 
30.92 IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY 
33.17 ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY AT THE TEMPE CAMPUS 
33.5 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA 
34.83 UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST 
35.42 MIAMI UNIVERSITY-OXFORD 
36.83 THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE 
40 UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
40.08 SUNY AT BUFFALO 
40.42 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SANTA CRUZ 
40.42 UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT LINCOLN 
41 NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY AT RALEIGH 
42.08 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-RIVERSIDE 
42.17 UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE 
44.42 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
44.5 SUNY AT BINGHAMTON 
44.83 AUBURN UNIVERSITY MAIN CAMPUS 
45.42 UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 
46.08 OHIO UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
49.25 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO 
49.33 UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 
49.33 SUNY AT ALBANY 
49.67 WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY 
50.42 UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA NORMAN CAMPUS 
52.92 OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY 
53.58 UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT AND STATE AGRICULTURAL COLL 
54.83 CLEMSON UNIVERSITY 
55.42 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
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55.75 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY 
59.83 GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 
60 TEMPLE UNIVERSITY 
60.17 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA-COLUMBIA 
61.33 UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO-MAIN CAMPUS 
62.5 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE-MAIN CAMPUS 
64.75 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE 
66.58 VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY 
67.25 LOUISIANA STATE UNIV & AG & MECH & HEBERT LAWS CTR 
67.33 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA 
68.08 UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM 
68.08 UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
69.25 THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA 
69.75 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI-MAIN CAMPUS 
71.17 TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 
71.75 INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY-INDIANAPOLIS 
73.42 UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MANOA 
74.83 THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS 
75.17 SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY 
76.67 WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY 
78.08 WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY 
78.25 OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
78.33 UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON-UNIVERSITY PARK 
79.58 MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY 
80.58 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT DENVER 
80.75 NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
80.92 UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
81.42 OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
82.08 SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CARBONDALE 
82.42 UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MAIN CAMPUS 
83.42 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
83.42 UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO 
85.5 UNIVERSITY OF MAINE 
85.75 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO 
86.08 UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND-BALTIMORE COUNTY 
87.17 THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA-MISSOULA 
87.17 KENT STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
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87.17 UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING 
87.42 UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS MAIN CAMPUS 
88.5 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 
91.17 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY 
94.92 THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON 
97.58 BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
100.17 BALL STATE UNIVERSITY 
102.08 NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
102.33 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA 
103.25 PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
105.58 MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY-BOZEMAN 
106.33 MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY 
106.33 UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA-RENO 
106.58 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA-MAIN CAMPUS 
107.25 ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY 
107.58 WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
107.75 INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 
107.83 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST LOUIS 
108.25 NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY 
110.08 UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS 
111.25 UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE 
113.58 NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
115.75 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
115.75 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS 
116.5 UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS 
117.83 IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY 
118.42 TEXAS WOMAN'S UNIVERSITY 
120.17 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO 
120.17 UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS 
121.17 NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
121.42 WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY 
121.42 UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-LOWELL 
122.5 UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA 
126.92 LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY 
127.08 FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY-BOCA RATON 
127.83 WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY-MAIN CAMPUS 
129.33 FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
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130.08 TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY-COMMERCE 
130.83 INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA-MAIN CAMPUS 
133 UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO 
133 UNIVERSITY OF AKRON MAIN CAMPUS 
134.83 CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
136.25 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI 
138.75 TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY 
139.25 MIDDLE TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY 
139.83 TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY 
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